A Sketch of Feeling Generalization: A Cognitive-Existential Analysis of Psychology

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Abstract

Following a review of literature regarding autobiographical memories, retrieval-induced forgetting, and emotion relative to memory, a theory is devised to find solutions to the questions: How do we conceptualize; what does it mean to conceptualize; and how is memory retrieval possible? Feeling generalization is a universal system of thinking which postulates that which we conceive and retrieve is feeling upon which we conceptualize to conceptions in accord to the moment of arousal. The world of the individual, as its capacity to know, is defined by how the individual attributes the moment's particulars to feeling; or by its concern. An individual's interpretation of stimuli is restricted by the moment whereby the individual is found to exist consciously. The arousal of a moment follows a presupposed anticipatory knowing whereby the presence of arousal signifies an inconsistency in the anticipation of our knowing. Thereby, feeling is conceptualized to amend the contextual understanding where it becomes calibrated with our knowing. This means that, once again, conceptions are the intellectualization of feeling relative to the moment and our understanding. Furthermore, an individual can change that which causes arousal by conceptualizing. The individual strives to keep its world uniformly colored and familiar where inconsistencies in color or unfamiliarity are appropriated to what is momentarily understood. If an individual were to realize or accept these aforementioned principles, it would have greater control over its life in so far as that which affects it.

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Part One: Literature Review

Introduction

The recollection of two memories may occur from the basis of a common feature or from two separate features where the two memories are perceived as unique such as ‘a scarf’ and ‘a dog’. The amount of unique memories recalled simultaneously is contingent upon the capacities of working memory. However, are the two memories really unique and not merely less similar? A memory does not generate without cause, although it may seem to at times. A memory requires a cue, which directs the focus of attention on a representation or presentation. One’s ability to recall a particular representation of a particular context depends on one’s understanding of prior experiences being representations. The relation between cue and memory rests on the familiarity, resemblance, identification of the prior data. The perception of present data is referred by the understanding of similar known data: Isomorphic knowledge structures. As understanding varies, so may the perception of the data, thereby, different understandings in so far as separate individuals have different descriptions of similar data. Where we have a stimulus triggering a contextual understanding, the recalled memories are associated to that understanding. In the situation that unique memories are to be recalled and maintained within the allotment of space in one’s working memory capacity; the effects may be represented as one’s ability to integrate data. Under the presumption of an all-inclusive understanding, all data shares a common feature beyond its immediate sensible and rather particular relation to the observer; information relates to other information. Even the idea of unknown data stems from its relation to known similar or dissimilar data. Now that we have expressed the potentiality of all items being interrelated, there is the need to explain variations in accessibility of particular data or other data. The assumption follows that some items are simply more readily recalled than others.

Given an undefined amount of time, one is able to draw as many relations between seemingly differentiated memories as their cognitive abilities permit. However, in the real world, most of us don’t have the time to spend or the time to react in such fashion. The memories that are rapidly retrieved from a cue are presumed most similar in content relative the cue. However, what is the predicate for the determination of a representation being more similar than another? Since similarity is dependent on a potentially all-inclusive understanding; the more similar representation would be a representation that is more accessible. The most accessible or similar

representation would be one that is currently within attention and working memory. A scientist that believes nature to operate mathematically and keeps that notion in mind sees the world accordingly. The representations already in attention are presumed to be the ones in use or of relevance to the current understanding of the perceived data. Since there are other representations that may be equally or more important or pertinent within memory, however not recalled for the present task, the assumption follows that since the recalled memory is in use that utilization determines accessibility. An immediate recalled memory or representation in relation to an inquiry or task at hand has a forgetting effect on other memories. Reasoning and time can, probabilistically, avert the said effect.

Although accessibility may be defined by practice and exposure, the question about the determination of perceived content needs more explanation. Accessibility may account for extraction or expression of representations for the understanding and conceptualization of data, but those relations were established upon a reference that mere accessibility can't explain. Accessibility determines the recollection of representations within a pattern of understanding, but that presumes something else to be at the foundation of the determination of content. The determination of the initial content stands in relation to all representations of understanding: It is the primitive content. To say I see bear and run from bear presuppose underlying motivation, anticipation. The determination of content or use of understanding is the systemization of biological/chemical events. Understanding catalogues conceptions of the effects of stimuli relative to the individual's biology. The primitive determination is the biological reaction to stimuli or simply, the emotional response.

The possibility now stands that an emotional response provides the basis for the sensation of data, but the quest for the determinant of content has not been fulfilled. The emotional response cannot determine the importance of data alone beyond mere reflex. The determination of content requires an ideal that provides a pull, which converts the potential energy of emotional response into kinetic. The determination of content, which provides the purpose of energy expenditure, is the reason, aim or a goal. Where the emotional response is the primitive determination of data, which triggers attention; one's aims or goals are the conjugate determination of data that defines the relation of the data to the current endeavor of the individual. The particular reason or goal at a particular time is a maintained memory, which

subsumes an emotional response. The further determination of content rests upon its relation to the content currently being maintained. In the event of the determination of relevant data, the maintained content is transformed. In the event of a transformation, the goal or aim may shift entirely due to reasons of relevancy or forgetting. Over time the goal may gradually morph due to similar reasons. Understanding is never curbed, but doctored to accommodate necessary assimilation. The emotional response, although limitedly controlled by the guiding goal, may cue data as being outside of context that can distract the attention of the individual and affect the maintenance of the held content or goal. Due to this characteristic of the emotional response, the understanding possesses a flexibility that permits generalization, abstraction, and overall, a versatile understanding. In the event that attention was stationary and emotional responses were completely regulated, all knowledge would be in relation to the determined goal or maintained content where a potential limit to understanding is grounded. However, assuming an all-inclusive understanding, one would not come to the realization of a finite limit in understanding. Something not understood is understood as such. How one reacts to not understanding a subject is conditioned by the context, but not without freedom.

As goals shift and transform so may the accessibility of memories. If all memories are context oriented, then upon a shift in the conjugate content determinant or goal, the meaning of content and accessibility of prior memories transform in relation to the currently maintained content. But, what is the extent to which representations vary or are forgotten? This question in addition to the nature and form of autobiographical memories; their relation to emotion; and the effects of retrieval on incidental forgetting is the pull of this paper. Up ahead, the paper will break up into two main sections on our journey from the formation of memory to the evolution of memory to the dismissal of memory. The first section relates to the formation of memory relative to autobiographical memories and emotion; and the effects of emotion on memory retrieval. The second section concerns retrieval-induced forgetting including its nature, limits, modulating factors, and alternative viewpoints on the main component of retrieval-induced forgetting. The first section account for the first two destinations (formation and evolution of memory) while the second section implicitly covers what the first had missed and completes the journey to the third and final destination (dismissal of memory). To facilitate comprehension and to provide points for reflection, each section is broken into subsections. Finally, a conclusion will recapitulate the main points and aim of the paper to provide an established basis for future

inquiry. The aim is to shed insight on the form of autobiographical memories relative to retrieval and its corollaries in addition to providing a hopefully sufficient background for the forthcoming investigation on feeling generalization, following this review.

Autobiographical Memories and Emotion

The notion of self must have its origins. The notion is not merely sensible; it is a notion generated by a will and is rendered intelligible. The self may be experienced through familiarity of the external stimuli, but the self must have been established beforehand so that such acknowledgement may be made. The notion of self is composed of information pertaining to what we'd find necessary to define our self. However, what information would be considered necessary must imply an objective, which must possess additional knowledge before the self may be established conceptually. Before the establishment of self, an information reference must have been obtained to provide the possibility of determining the self through motivated behavior or simply, willingness. The concept of motivated behavior presupposes an objective, a goal, which poses as the reference for self and moreover, memories related to the self (Schank, 1982). The Self Memory System (SMS) covers these areas in the explanation of autobiographical memory manifestation. The model is split into two halves consisting of a knowledge base which would be the information reference and the working self which would be the motivated behavior (Rubin, 1996). However, as noted before, before the use of motivated behavior which acts upon pre-existing knowledge to attain knowledge for self determination, there must be an earlier, more primitive method of information acquisition before the conscious working self or motivated behavior. What is at the core of motivated behavior? An inert organism does not engage in processing or at least retain information for future use, but emotion or arousal, on the other hand, in addition to the evolutionary will to survive, is a capable mechanism of early information processing which could act as the basis of our information or self knowledge.

Within the pages to follow, the process by which an individual develops the self from the excavation of basic information to the purposeful precision chiseling of particular information will be elucidated. The first section will be dedicated to the excavation of elementary information and more particularly to the effects of emotion on memory. In the second section, we will explore autobiographical memories according to the SMS model and recapitulate with the inclusion of emotion.

Subjective Emotion

Before we delve into the topic of emotion, it would be most prudent to establish a base that may serve as a means of interpreting ambiguous information concerning emotion. Emotion comes in two variants: Animal emotion and human emotion. The manifolds that comprise the animal variant are subsumed in the human variant. Animal emotion is strictly arousal, which is associated to the autonomic nervous system, whereas the human emotion includes the addition of conscious emotion or valence (Kinsinger, 2004). Stimuli that trigger the sympathetic nervous system consist of stimuli that interact with the primary biological needs, such as those pertaining to survival: Pain as a common source of deterrent and food or other activities that stimulate the production of chemicals such as dopamine are a common source of auspicious stimuli. The idea follows that a biological reaction to a stimulus elicits a behavioral reaction or a predisposition towards a behavior. The animal emotion is a precursor for the conditioning of behavior. Emotion, in this sense, is a response to anything that elicits arousal for as long as it elicits arousal. The conditioning is directed by a physical influence. The word emotion and its various subtypes are a conception of an experience, not just a sensible presentation.

Before the development of optimal cognitive capacities, humans possess a variant of emotion similar to that of the animal variant. This animal or early variant is the basis of the cognitive emotion of humans upon which the human emotion begins to vary from the more primordial animal variant. Nonexistent stimuli, such as imaginative thought, possess the potential to be arousing for the humans. The cognitive abilities of humans permit the transcendence of particular concrete information to general knowledge where imaginative processes dwell. The conditioning of behavior is initiated by physical influence, but for humans that physical influence may be influenced by an imaginative source such as anticipation and expectation in so far as the experience of such influence. The possible conception of causality differentiates the arousal of neutral stimuli between animal and human upon which follows the possibility for the analysis of positive and negative stimuli through goal-oriented behavior. Human emotion can be based on the anticipation of physical arousal or simply, mental arousal. Thereby, emotion to humans takes on multiple meanings because of the various ways by which one may associate arousal and stimuli to the self. However, invariantly, emotion is the foundation of motivated behavior through either physical influence or mental influence where the latter is grounded by the former.

Granted, some animals may possess emotional aspects similar to human emotion, but the point was to differentiate between a more primitive and a more advanced or derived concept of emotion where at the higher levels, the possibility of emotional experience and modulation are greater. Further uses of the words 'human' and 'animal' will be in reference to the emotional variants. When we use words that denote emotion, such as anger or a threat, they go beyond what is meant by the animal variant of emotion, thereby animal variant emotion is not emotion in our common conception of emotion. Perhaps, the idea would best be thought of as a caterpillar and butterfly, where emotion, as we commonly perceive it, is the butterfly.

Now with the foundation laid, we may begin exploring the effects of emotion of memory. Most noticeably, in a general manner, emotion may be used as a means of organizing memory in so far as memory serves as a basis of motivated behavior (Sison, 2007). Assuming that people avoid the infliction of death upon one self, for the basis of future actions, people may organize experiences, where information is obtained, into two broad categories: Those that cause harm and those that don't and the multiple subcategories within. This particular activity is an example of a premise of a basic motivated behavior that animals possess. For humans, however, the allocation of valence is likely to be relative to the context and content pertaining to memories of either general category. Information or experience that generated memories of harm or death would equate to a negative memory through the anticipation of physical arousal viz. pain and information or experience that generated 'safe' memories would equate to a positive moment when in relation to the harmful memories. But, when the 'safe' memories stand alone or are in comparison to other memories, there valence may vary. The anticipation of arousal may be enough to warrant particular behavior, but could such motivation affect the retrieval of other memories? Could our memories be affected without the direct influence of arousal viz. sympathetic arousal?

Given the cognitive abilities of humans, the effect of sympathetic arousal, being that it is an experience, could elicit other experiences, information or memories that resemble the particularly current experience. Since humans are capable of associating valence to neutral or imaginative stimuli, a single experience may impact the current and future processing of the individual. Various studies have tested the effect of negative affectivity and depression on memory and forgetting with various results. Studies using either a directed forgetting (intentional)

or retrieval-induced forgetting (unintentional) paradigm that have controlled for arousal, valence, negative affectivity and/or mood have found impairment on forgetting (Bauml, 2007; Groome, 2008; Kuhbander, 2008; Joslyn, 2005; Myers, 2004; and Barnier, 2007), where as others have found no impairment on forgetting (Moulds, 2006; Barnier, 2004; and Wessel, 2006a). Other than methodological variations, the variation in results could be associated to the subject's experience of arousal and the necessary allocation of that arousal to a particular memory. Since memories are established by prior experiences which are interpreted by information of existing related experiences, the particular experience one perceives is unique to the individual. In addition, the degree of arousal may be influenced by the current behavior and mood of the individual and by the level of threat the memory poses to the current individual's position. More on the effects of behavior on memory will be discussed in the second section.

Arousal being the basic determinant of emotion, where valence is founded upon a prior experience of arousal, motivated behavior would be expected to influence memory in so far as the memories serve the purpose of guiding the particular motivated behavior. Arousal has been found to impact the ability to forget (Kuhbander, 2008) and overall performance of memory (Bradley, 1992) where memories are more resistant to being ignored. Perhaps, arousing stimuli are not more resistant to being ignored, but are instead more resistant toward disengagement which would suppose that, in a situation where negative affectivity is involved and preferred to be avoided, that these particular situations are processed more readily than, let's say, a stimulus that involves conscious encoding and engagement (Kinsinger, 2004). Within an environment that possesses an arousing stimulus, attention would be fixed or reoriented toward the stimulus and under the cue utilization theory (Kinsinger, 2004), by which emotional arousing stimuli consume attentional resources, information processing which grounds memory formation is guided by such emotional cues. With arousing stimuli occupying attention, the assumption that forgetting requires attention as putting attention into something other than that which one wants to forget, and the assumption that attention is limited, the findings that arousal impacts memory performance are logical. In addition, this perspective could be extended to motivated behavior fain arousal in its influence on memory performance, because arousal found the goals by which one would orient towards in a motivated fashion. Interestingly, highly rated valenced items, both positive and negative, have also been found to be highly arousing (Bradley, 1992), which

suggests a correlation that implies a connection between physical arousal and cognition, which corroborates the notion that goal-oriented action is emotional as characterized earlier.

To the extent that emotion guides attention which directs the processing and extraction of information, memory is at the mercy of emotion. However, humans are in possession of the potential to subjugate their reactions to stimuli and to establish emotional responses to otherwise neutral and imaginative stimuli, which makes possible the regulation and extended coordination of goal-oriented or motivated behavior. If all actions demand a motive, the human variant will express its motive in a general relation to the perceived context of a memory of a physical experience through anticipation; whereas the animal variant would express its motive in direct relation to the experience of the physical influence. The animal variant would not experience doubt in response to the thought of a potential failure at hunting, whereas the human variant might and thereby, may engage in behavior to make assurances of success to the extent that doubt is not longer experienced. Goal-oriented or motivated behavior is a response to an emotional cue either physical or mental. Hereby imminently stated, attention is necessary for the encoding and retrieval of information. Attention is focused on stimuli or data that possess emotional relevance as defined above; and to the extent that data does not stand apart emotionally, it is deemed as not important to one's task and is dismissed from awareness or ignored. However, on the other hand, data of importance seizes attention until its deemed by the task or purpose no longer relevant, which implies consequences that affect disengagement. Next, we shall turn our attention to the matters of autobiographical memory and its structure.

Autobiographical Memory

With the effects of emotion on memory stated, the ground work for the origin of autobiographical memories has already been laid. The difference between ordinary memory and autobiographical memory is an example of misinterpretation of language or expression. However, under the view that we have been postulating, all memories are autobiographical. All of our memories have or had served a purpose for the determination of our actions. Memories are formed because the contents were of greater importance in relation to other information within the environment that may have been processed and stored where the reason for that importance relates to the self at that time. In simpler, yet less eloquent words, current goals guide executive processes (Barnier, 2004; and Conway, 2000b).

Memories that are accessible may imply the relevancy of the content of those memories to our goals. However, before we discuss this possibility, it would not be amiss to mention that our goals and memories are not static, but moving; as our understanding and goals progress so do our memories to the extent of our conception of those memories where the particulars, as details, vary, but their form persists. These changes occur because of the process of learning or transcendence, whereby, information is transcended to reach an ideal. The consequent information of transcendence may be either consolidated or inhibited or both depending on the method by which one goes about achieving one's goal and the significance of the information to the goal. An explanation why form persist, but details don't is because the form is universal to contexts, but details aren't. Similar items are similarly understood and this is the principle that we use to latch on to the ideal or goal. Again, the contents of memories vary over time as memories are shaped (Conway, 2000a).

So then what might be the form of a memory? According to the self-memory model (Rubin, 1996; and Conway, 2000b), the structure of a memory comes in three parts: Lifetime knowledge/periods, general knowledge, and event-specific knowledge. Whether or not there are three distinct parts is another question. The content of the structure is not important beyond the frame of it. The main idea that one should draw from this is that memories possess a common structure with variable guts, which are the constituents of the context.

Lifetime periods are long-term goal determined periods that extend beyond the duration of months and general knowledge (Rubin, 1996; and Conway, 2000b). Lifetime periods are themes, abstractions, shells, by which more concise information is fitted. In common with Schank's (1982) memory organization packets, it is a grouping or category of like memories that fit within a limited temporal frame. Perhaps, a less obtuse phrasing of the statement would be that they are a grouping or category of a limited temporal frame, by which applicable memories may be fitted. Generally, the periods are defined by a common feature that general knowledge shares where general knowledge may be incorporated into multiple periods (Reiser, 1985; and Conway, 1987). Essentially, in so far as the expression of memories and the presupposing determination of such memories, memories are organized relative to a referenced applicable theme, however, insomuch as memories are conceptions of events as they are represented to our self, they are organized into categories of events of variable extension, time, and purpose

(Robinson, 1976). One may then conclude that the determination of autobiographical memories is teleological in nature. Further, since individual periods contain memories that possess common features, the contents of individual periods vary where forgetting or inhibition occurs between common memories of particular periods (Barnier, 2007). The reduction in forgetting that occurred within a related period implicates the notion of common features among memories of a period. The assumption follows that the 2nd list cued items from the first. The reason for the inhibition will be discussed in a later section.

At the bottom end of the structure rests the event-specific knowledge (ESK), which resembles a sensory perception that is utilized as a cue, similar to that of lifetime periods, for memory retrieval and conception. The ESK are concrete instances of the individual's surrounding which catch the attention of the observer, whereas lifetime periods may not be sensed directly. The purpose that they serve is fulfilled in so far as they are rehearsed and associated with an event or task where its relation to the particular task remains intact for as long as it is maintained (Conway, 2000b). Thereby, again, the information that comprise lifetime periods consist of ESK where the information is most particular. Consider the development of an ideal from the mere perception of a sense. Our experiences, which are the foundation of our ideas, are purely sensational. Our ideas are sensational in so far as they relate to an experience.

If the ESK is forgotten for whatever reason, assuming the task remains static; the dismissal of the concrete information would at the very most delay development of the task. Whereas, as the task shifts or the goal varies, the particular content of that relation may no longer be a necessity for the functioning of the task; the experience may be reinterpreted for relevancy toward the new task. If a goal shift occurred as a consequence of the perception of an ESK, the two goals were related insomuch as one subsumed the other. Thereby, the recollection of the ESK occurs from top-down where the general knowledge is used to generate an ESK instead of the reverse, by which it may have originated. The implication is that ESK are of no more importance than the purpose of relating or cuing a memory, because their meanings to the individual are subsumed in the general knowledge which is classified by and included in the lifetime period. The logic follows that depending on the direction by which one is going, either bottom-up or top-down, the results may vary. As long as one moves from lifetime to ESK, the particulars recalled will be consistent to the notion of the lifetime period or task at hand.

However, if one were to move from ESK to lifetime period where each stage is capable of modulating the next without the inclusion of the guiding underlying goal, then the determined associated goal in relation to the goal used to extract memories from the top-down approach, may differentiate. If the dog were in need of expelling its bladder it may conjure a memory of a hydrant, which may further trigger the memory of smelling foreign urine. However, if the same dog were to start with the memory of a smell of foreign urine by the hydrant, the memory induced could be food foraging. The logic follows that the determination of a memory is relative to the viewpoint, where the viewpoint consists of one's knowledge, which constitutes intention or goal. The moving factor is the working self and upon this topic we turn to next.

The motor of this model is the working self, which is fueled by the knowledge base (Rubin, 1996; and Conway, 2000b). Memories are formed to satisfy the working self, which is the product and contributor of the knowledge base. All of our information, memories, knowledge is stored within the knowledge base where the working self biases the encoding and retrieval of information in favor of its current endeavors. Accordingly, memories contain the goals of the working self (Conway, 2000b). If the working self were to guide attention, our attention would be utilized in matters relevant to tasks or goals of the working self. In so far as attention is required for memory retrieval and memory formation, our memories exist to the extent that they relate to the working self, which had guided attention. The goals of the working self are the reference for the distribution of attention, whereby even the encoding of information that may not seem to be directly related to the goal at hand is in fact related because the distracting stimulus is defined relative to the reference, which is the goal. If living were defined as a universal goal, all memories are products of the maintenance of that goal. Further categorization of memories may be attributed to goals, sub-goals, or derivations that presume the necessity of the first.

The working self, as an entity, inhabits the archive of all knowledge (experienced knowledge). Its light through the halls of the archive is the focus of our direction and motivation. Our sight never ventures beyond the glow of its light. That which it sheds its light upon is the basis of our present knowing, but not the extent. However, the wick on its candle is short and the room is breezy; without the proper preparation for the prevention of decay and interference, its work will have to start again from a redefined step one where there is no knowing what the light

will reveal the next time around. But each time we restart, the knowledge obtained from prior efforts is retained; assuming that the light travels down known territory, this knowledge may be utilized to expedite navigation and to avoid the breezy corridors, which had extinguished prior endeavors.

Summary

Under the situation where living is determined as the universal goal of things living or at the very least, the first goal of things living, the biological mechanisms of the organism facilitate the maintenance of that goal. Representations of stimuli that induce physical reactions are stored in which the basis of motivated behavior is established. Under the guidance of the primary goal, life is directed away from stimuli that bring physical harm, whereas humans are also found directed against stimuli that bring mental harm if representations exist in storage for such stimuli that elicit such a response. As the intricacies of human life evolve when living becomes trivial, goals diversify and emotions grow seemingly complex. Goals form on top of other goals, where emotions still adhere to the principle it held for the primary goal. The memories that we hold are in relation to the multiple life treks that our goals have directed us on for as long as the primary goal was fulfilled. The determination of the current goal is founded by the knowledge obtained from the process of acquiring prior goals.

Memories are grouped into broad categories that represent prior endeavors. Particular memories are retrieved or actualized by the representations of the effect of stimuli on ourselves relative to the referenced currently perceived and held goal. Emotion being the foundation for the possibility of reason and judgment determines the effects', as a direction, that are presented in association to the current goal. Emotion, in relation to the primary goal of living, was a fundamental mechanism for determining the means of maintaining the goal. Emotion, in relation to secondary goals subsumed by the primary, is adopted in a similar fashion for the determination of the means in goal acquisition. The secondary goals stand in so far as the primary is upheld, which emotion founded the possibility. The knowledge obtained from the primary goal of living constitutes the subsequent goals, which emotion provided the basis. The principle of emotion sustains, but its involvement is no longer direct as it may have been during the procurement of the primitive, primary goal. Early judgment may have been determined by

the experience of harm or not, however later judgment functions off the conceptions of the former relative to the held goal which are representations of the initial reaction.

A memory is the conception of a representation of a stimulus. The conception is determined by the current goal of the individual not only at the time of encoding, but also at retrieval in so far as the conception being the relation of the representation to the individual's goal. The same goes for conceptions of representations between items whereby specifics are determined by the focus of the attention of the individual. The consistency found across memories stems from their purpose of carrying out motivated behavior when they are generated or retrieved: Memory retrieval and generation are consequences of apperceptive processes. However, the content of a particular memory permits interaction across other memories if contexts are shared, which permits easier accessibility of pertinent memory for the execution of desired tasks. Within the sections to come, the effects of retrieval will be explained in greater detail. The note to take away here is that memories are susceptible to the polymorphism of human cognition, but are delimited by their universal function: To the extent that content and function are related, the seemingly ambiguous nature of a polymorphic operator is balanced.

With the foundation of memory set, we are ready to proceed toward interactions between memories, in particularly, during retrieval. In the following sections, the effects of memory retrieval will be discussed in the context of retrieval-induced forgetting. Retrieval-induced forgetting or RIF is the effect of the incidental forgetting of a memory as a result of retrieving a related memory. The point of interest here is to determine the limits of this effect. All memories are similar to the extent of their nature, but similarities vary across their specified function and content. Some memories share common content and common function, but others may share commonalities in particulars of content, but not function. However, within the latter condition, to determine commonalities in particulars of content between memories that do not share function incurs a shift in attention and a consequent motive (content defines function like general knowledge to lifetime knowledge). How might function define content? Are the effects of retrieving two fruit items the same as retrieving two memories from a common presupposed lifetime period? The notions of two fruit share a more obvious common understanding than two memories from a common lifetime period. The differences in retrieval performance may lie in the different modes of processing used to discriminate between particularities and generalities

between memories. In correspondence, memory performance may differentiate between top-down and bottom-up determination of content.

Retrieval-Induced Forgetting

A memory in comparison to mere thought or notion, in the form of an inquiry or idea, represents a moments' conception of an experience, which takes in both sensible and psychological factors of content, manifold, particular determination; a conception in relation to the current or present self experience. A mere thought or notion would be a moments' conception of or relative to a memory. Memories provide the means for the possibility of understanding. It separates a novel event from an old event through the recollection of a similar event from experience, upon which events or sensations that are sensed similarly are understood similarly. The question of whether or not this event is considered novel or old is based upon the events resemblance to the contents of memory at that particular moment. However, this determination is obscured by multiple memories that could, depending on polymorphic factors such as mood and frame of mind, equally resemble the observed single event. Now we are ready to proclaim the question of interest: What happens to the similar yet unrecalled unpracticed memories?

Cues within the environment trigger memories. These cues will be dubbed retrieval cues with the meaning of an organization tool for the formation of a given grouping of items (Rundus, 1973). Essentially, a retrieval cue provides an otherwise inert stimulus with a property to activate a stored representation. For example, upon sight of the color red, a memory of a fire hydrant is prompted. Retrieval cues are established through conditioning and are thereby conditional. The assumption of the color red being the sole cue for fire hydrant is a delusional notion. They are present to us according to that which we are concerned. The perception of the context, which is also conditional, the state of the observer itself, and the contents of working memory are implicit cues upon the result. Perhaps, the observer was a dog with the capabilities of seeing the color red and the desire to expel the contents of its bladder. However, let's say that the same dog possesses a bed of the same color that provides similar relief and is in understanding of this association. The fact that fire hydrant was cued, or at least objectively expressed, that bed was available, and that all cues being equal implicates a mechanism for the suppression of bed. Again, why fire hydrant and not bed?

Retrieval-induced forgetting is a noted consequence of retrieval where information that is not retrieved, yet similarly related, is suppressed (Anderson, 1994). The retrieval of fire hydrant suppressed the memory of bed. If bed were not associated with the relation or cue similarly to fire hydrant, then it would not have been suppressed in response to the association. However, there are conditions that show suppression independent of the retrieval cue which will be discussed later. Now we will spend a brief moment explaining a few terms before proceeding: Suppression as defined by Radavansky (1999) is a mechanism that reduces the activation of a mental representation will be used synonymously with inhibition as defined similarly by Anderson (??). A mental representation that's not in-mind cannot be sensed intelligibly through projection.

In a situation where the elicitation of a particular mental representation had not encountered interference from competing mental representations, inhibition or the effects of inhibition would not be experienced. Logically, competition begets inhibition (Conway, 2000a; Smith, 2000; Radavansky, 1999; and Shivde, 2001). If competition were to induce inhibition and a situation by which inhibition was found to be absent, competition, according to the premise, could be absent. If the process of inhibition is the means by which we recall particular memories and not others, then an explanation of the corollary of interference accumulation from across memories would not be amiss.

Given what has been mentioned about the establishment of understanding upon memory and the effects of retrieval, it would serve well to mention the nature of the interference that affects competition. Interference occurring during retrieval is the result of a conflict or rival memories competing for selection. The activity presumes that there is an ideal memory for retrieval and ultimately a goal is subsumed. The retrieval process itself is a learning event, by which the recollection of the memory will enhance the subsequent recall of the retrieved memory (Anderson, 1994). Learning is initiated through questions which are generated by conflict. Once the conflict has been resolved and the solution integrated into understanding or a memory structure, the specific questions that once arose from that specific conflict will no longer yield learning; conflict had been rectified. If there is no inhibition, then there is no competition; if there is no competition, then there is no interference; if there is no interference, then there is no conflict; and if there is no conflict, then there are no inquiries. Isomorphic to the effects of

retrieval inhibition, the interference that occurs at an early stage is only relevant for that stage, from which interference had occurred, inasmuch as the basis of the interference includes prior experience. Thereby, retrieval-induced forgetting resolves the current interference during the retrieval stage (Groome, 2008). Our prior learning accounts for our current learning as interpretation is grounded by understanding.

Within the context of recalling information from long-term memory, inhibition has been found to affect situations fain individual concepts (Radavansky, 1999). Findings that specific information dissipates more rapidly over time (Conway, 2000a; Hunt, 1981; Radavansky, 1999; and Mandler, 1980) than abstract, general information corroborate the idea that long-term memory is composed of or accessible by vast structures of concepts, as forms, or more accurately, heuristics as implicitly postulated earlier and discussed more explicitly later.

Earlier it had been said that retrieval cues elicit memory and with the inclusion of competition being the source of inhibition, we are able to see further into the effect of retrieval. The question pertaining to what happens to similar, yet unselected memories may be attributed to inhibition. Within the pages to come we will discuss the factors that affect retrieval-induced forgetting videlicet integration and similarity; the extent to which inhibition affects memory; and finally, alternative mechanisms for interpreting retrieval-induced forgetting.

Modulating Factors of Inhibition: Integration and Similarity

Integration can be most simply seen as a consolidation unit for individual memories (Anderson, 1999; Tulving, 1966; and Cofer, 1965). It is a network of memories that share a common factor, yet are distinct to maintain individuality. In other words, integration isn't mere similarity as equality; it provides relative definite distinctiveness through a common structure. If the memories were the same in so far as being identical then memories would be a single average memory. The discriminative or facilitative processing of item comparison for retrieval is the processing of distinctiveness (Smith, 2000). The determination of a memories relation to the target involves processes of discrimination and organization (Hunt, 1981). Essentially, this is an interpretative process, by which we appropriate things, stimuli, be it what you may, into not understanding as a knowing, because that was presupposed by the act of interpretation, but into what is before us as what is present.

Retrieval-induced forgetting effects are sensitive to the relation between the target and cue. Integration and similarity are modulating factors of inhibition (Anderson, 2003), by which variation in these factors condition variations in inhibition of similar, yet unselected words or more specifically, the unpracticed related items (RP-). Integration is perceived to impair retrieval-induced forgetting effects through implementation of item components into a common structure. Similar to an incidental learning study conducted by McDaniel (1977), participants whom were asked to draw connections between items (intentional/integration condition) were found to recall more RP- items than those that were not instructed to draw connections between items (incidental condition). However, over a delayed response, participants in the incidental group were showing results similar to the intentional/integration condition (Anderson, 1999; Postman, 1968), which was found to be associated to a clustering effect within the incidental group among high frequency items (McDaniel, 1977). The effects of integration on retrieval-induced forgetting appear to be modulated by attention and executive control. The use of integration organized the items into a structure with a common concept. In so far as attention regulates integration, retrieval-induced forgetting is modulated by executive control.

The fashion by which one organizes and relates the items to one another affects the recall of the unpracticed related items differently. On the one hand, if similar, related rival or competitor items are consolidated into a common structure independent of the presented cue, retrieval-induced forgetting effect is magnified (Smith, 2000; and Anderson, 2003). This effect may be explained by the reformation of a common structure during the practice phase (*Note: The practice phase refers to the second phase in the RIF paradigm where participants practice a portion of the examples from a portion of the categories*). Understanding, which had accounted for all known competitors prior to the practice phase, was updated during the practice phase; resulting in a refined structure that had been generated through inhibition in the practice phase. This effect may be due to a change in cue association that left the unpracticed items without association to the items in working memory or without indirect rehearsal and therefore vacating working memory and making them inaccessible or less accessible. Essentially, what one had been trying to recall during the retrieval phase was information from what had been unlearned. This form of similarity is called competitor-competitor similarity (Anderson, 2003). Whereas on the other hand, when competitor items and the presented cue are consolidated into a common structure competitor-target similarity is produced (Bauml, 2002; and Anderson, 2003). In this

sort of situation, as the procedure carries out, the same structure is maintained until retrieval. The unpracticed items remain accessible, which increment their recollection for the duration of the structures activation.

In sum, the greater the degree of competitor-competitor similarity, the greater the retrieval-induced forgetting effect. The greater the degree of the competitor-target similarity, greater the reduction in retrieval-induced forgetting effect. The degree by which a competing memory is impaired is contingent on its relation to the target. The inhibition effect may be a factor of learning context discrepancies, where differences in contexts cue inhibition (Bjork, 1996). Perhaps, in a similar vein, inhibition from similarity is due to decremented overlap in meaning between items or synonymity (Cofer, 1965) where learning phases out what is irrelevant to current desire. Within the following section, we will discuss the nature of and the extent to which inhibition interacts with memory.

The Nature and Boundaries of Retrieval-Induced Forgetting

Inhibition is the result of interference from competing mental representations. The interference or competition is a product of similarity between the goal representation, being that which is sought after, and competing representations, which are determined, perhaps a priori, undesirable in so far as the determined goal. Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) acts upon the undesired similar items and the following assumption is that forgetting occurs because of the practice or rehearsal of items that are related, at one point, to the undesirable similar items. This phenomenon is an additional or merely more specific account of forgetting that is posited in classical interference theory where forgetting is a result of decay over time through mechanism such as retroactive inhibition and proactive inhibition. RIF presupposes forgetting to be the result of intentional, although consequential, inhibition of undesirable yet potential responses (Anderson,?? ; and Levy, 2002). The retrieval of desired representations decreases the activity of present prepotent undesirable representations. In other words, a consequence of retrieving a particular memory in response to a cue, suppresses the recollection of other related memories.

Before we proceed further, it would be of importance to discuss the relation between recall and recognition, because the two processes are not synonyms of each other. The differences between the two are grounded by the sort of understanding one possesses at the time

of affirmation, performance. Essentially, the two differ in the kind of information that is retrieved for performance. Recognition manifests when an event is known, but not the context (Mandler, 1980). These differences are relevant for our topic, because retrieval draws upon understanding which is comprised of categorical structures organized by context between observer and environment.

The repeated exposure of a particular representation facilitates the recollection of that particular response, but has no effect on the magnitude of the inhibited response during recollection (Anderson, 2003; Macrae, 1999; Shivde, 2001; and Macleod, 2002). The recollection of certain objects that are red will facilitate the future recollection of those certain objects and as a consequence of that behavior and consequent facilitation, will produce an effect that inhibits other unrehearsed red objects. The probability of recalling the unrehearsed items from the red category is reduced as a consequence by the facilitation from the rehearsal of other items from that category. However, noting that practice does affect the presence of RIF altogether, the repeated exposure of the practiced/rehearsed items does not correspond with variation in RIF effect. The variation in the magnitude of inhibition on unpracticed related items correlate to the strength of the undesirable/unpracticed related items (Anderson, 1994) assumingly in relation to the category, existing knowledge, and functions in an inverted U-shaped manner. An inconsistency may be observed from which undesirable items are regulated. It had been said earlier that they are not affected by the facilitation of practiced items. If the facilitations' magnitude varies with incremented exposure then as a result the undesirable related items would be reduced. However, this result may be masked if there are only a single practiced set of items in opposition to the rest being rendered unpracticed. Perhaps, if there were multiple tiers of practiced items, we may see the affect of practice exposure and similarity on inhibition. Contrary to Anderson's (1994) finding, another study found that the strength of the unpracticed related items didn't have an effect on RIF (Williams, 2001). In relation to the expression of an exemplar, the variation in strength of an inhibited exemplar is irrelevant. The differences between the two findings may have been the result of varied methodologies and materials. An account for this finding will be explained in the following section labeled: 'Explanations other than action inhibition.'

Interestingly, when a recognition test is given where one is asked to report the familiarity of a representation, one is able to acknowledge the familiarity of the undesirable items after the rehearsal of other related items in a RIF context; and were also able to recognize the to-be-forgotten items within a directed forgetting context (Anderson, 2003 and Wessel 2006a respectively). This finding supposes that the information is not completely forgotten in so far as being unavailable, but is inaccessible when asked to recall the memories; that retrieval is dependent on, in so far as being conditioned by, the cue used for retrieval (Tulving, 1966) and that retrieval is conditional. Furthermore, the reported familiarity may represent residue of an outdated understanding whereby the remnants of it are still accessible; where the updated understanding has not been conditioned as viable; or the newly formed contextual understanding is separate from the old where the undesirable representations remain active, but isomorphic to the new structure whereby assimilation is readily available for working memory. In other words, despite the structure established during rehearsal of certain red objects, the unrehearsed still remains associated to items that were rehearsed, which may give the effect of an unknown context. This view can account for the findings of fan effect (Radavansky, 1999) and the McGeoh's reponse competition theory (Anderson, 2003) where the presence of more related facts dilate the time needed to recognize the noted facts on a recognition test. Difficulty in a recognition task corresponds to the number of items and the strength or salience of those items. Within the idea that long-term memory consists of structures of organized memories, the occurrence of forgetting could be due to the limitations of working memory where storage and time are in low supply and high demand.

It has been noted that memories are prompted by retrieval cues, but it should be noted that a single memory may be a member of multiple cues, which produce access to a network of structures or individual isomorphic structures, which function in a network-like manner. The failure to recall a 'tomato' under the cue 'fruit' when other objects were rehearsed under the cue 'red' embraces this thought. The effects of RIF are cue-independent in so far as the memory is what is suppressed during retrieval and not the link to the particular given cue (Anderson, 1994). However, the presence of a broader network of memory associations may include the particular given cue as a sufficient, but not necessary means of retrieval. Tomato may not have been affected by rehearsal of its other given category members, but the structure used to understand the items overlapped with the category that had been practiced. Thereby, the link had never been

adequately manipulated. The process by which one engages in recollection of memories may involve the use of a single structure. In the condition where one is engaged in a learning process through rehearsal of representations, a structure for that learning process is being constructed. If the condition remains static, the structure initiated for rehearsal will be utilized for recollection or further rehearsal of the category particulars. However, if the conditions were to change and a separate structure were used for the recollection of the category particulars, the effects of inhibition from the rehearsal phase would not represent the inhibition found during recall. Thereby, over a long durations RIF effects will be reduced if memory structures are not controlled (Anderson, ??) due to the increased probability of memory structures evolving over time and reverting back to the average as dictated by one's environment.

The effects of inhibition found in RIF underlie multiple forms of data that utilize memory retrieval, such as in semantic relations (Macleod, 2002; and McDaniel, 1977), geometric stimuli (Ciranni, 1999), and eye witness memory (Macleod, 2002), which can all be inferred by the relation of structures or patterns to one another following the experience of stimuli/phenomena upon the premise of determining what is known (through reflection). The effects of RIF are the result of a judgment on the relation between an understanding of what is experienced and an understanding of what is known: Learning.

Explanations Other Than Active Inhibition

The rehearsal of a portion of the exemplars from a category facilitates future recall of the rehearsed exemplars making those particular exemplars more prominent relative to the exemplars that weren't rehearsed. The probability of retrieving and recalling exemplars from a category is greater for the ones practiced than those not practiced (Rundus, 1973). However, the probability of successive recall is also conditional upon the strength of the competing exemplars. Assuming that all exemplars are equal in strength, recall will depend upon the amount practiced, the space available in working memory, and external distractions which, depending on the nature of the distraction and ones concentration, can influence attention. Theoretically, related exemplars that possess very little strength, for whatever reason, are at a disadvantage when it comes to future recollection of exemplars from a category. However, the state of strength (weak versus strong) and inhibition may come down to mere rehearsal: Exemplars are weak because they are not frequently rehearsed.

Output interference being the recollection of the strongest exemplars first (rehearsal increments exemplar strength) may be accountable for the suppression that occurs through recall (Rundus, 1973; Roediger, 1973). The effect of output interference on retrieval is that it increases the probability of ceasing the scanning of exemplars from the particular cue. How long can one scan through a structure before it is dismissed by attention? The idea follows that when presented with a cue for recall, the individual cycles through the context structure/pattern, developed by the rehearsal of the exemplars of that particular cue, to select the most accessible exemplars. According to probability, by which exemplar practice increments likelihood of retrieval, the practiced items are more readily available for recall than those that weren't practiced or are weaker in strength. However, this scanning itself may act as covert retrieval or practicing which could sustain itself until the cessation of the task and thereby, account for the finding that impairment of the unpracticed related exemplars persisted when output order was controlled (Anderson, 1994). Similarly, it also accounts for Bauml's (1998) finding that output interference occurred for strong and not weak exemplars. In accordance with Anderson (1994), output interference may not be the sole reason for the effects of RIF: Related, yet different, memory structures may, through altercation of contexts, produce similar effects during recall or more accurately, the delineation of a particular structure of context. The change in pattern by a shift in context could neglect the other exemplars' (unpracticed related) inclusion.

The devised structure is established by the situation that the individual finds itself in. The individual extracts (into working memory) a structure that resembles the immediate context and updates the extracted structure according to the perceived context. Since no two contexts are the same, due to the reason of a phantasmagoric consciousness, structures may have a great deal of variation. During recall, when presented with a situation that resembles the practiced situation, the individual may recall the most recent structure used during that situation, which just so happened to be the practiced and RIF is observed. However, if the subject were presented with items/cues that belonged to a separate situation, say the one devised during the first phase of the retrieval-practice paradigm, they will recall the appropriate structure; and since no revisions have been made for that particular heuristic structure since the first phase, forgetting is not observed as long as there possesses no overlap among other structures.

Summary

The retrieval-induced forgetting effect is a consequence of learning where unrehearsed competitive representations are inhibited. Structures of context in memory are summoned into working memory on behalf of stimuli for the purpose of understanding (it is assumed that the need to know is a universal desire). The use of the structure changes the content or at the very least, the ordering of the contents. Upon the termination of the use of the structure, which may be due to a variety of factors such as a shift in attention, the structure is stored again for later use. However, structures isomorphic in context and content may evolve as related structures are altered and thereby content that may not have been prominent in one structure may become prominent upon the extraction and utilization of a structure containing the content. Other than the capacity of one's working memory being the extent to which an item is not expressed and thereby inhibited, shifts in context heuristic structures may also account for inaccessibility in a domain where the most accessible are retrieved. The inquiries pertaining to the whereabouts of the representations that were not retrieved and the form that such a process may flow was discussed. Retrieval-Induced forgetting makes visible the mechanics of learning.

General Summary

To the extent that the individual determines its surrounding, due to the influence of whatever reason, autobiographical memories are not an exception to the retrieval and consequent forgetting process (Barnier, 2004). Where we have the emotional response founding the expression of the self and its biased endeavors, the perception of a stimulus that elicits a response may change the perceived situational context. A particular context, which is determined in variation according to the individual's knowledge, self-control, and goals, cues particular integrated memories. Learning as a process integrates perceived similar representations of a context into the appropriate structure of contextually integrated memories. If A goes to A and B goes to B, B will not be placed with A unless B is perceived to share common ground as in being a member of a similar category. In so far as data is without sense or isn't attached through an association to some sensible data, the data is nonexistent; whereas data that is nonsense, but associated to something sensible, such as abstraction, is sensible on the basis of an adequate prior understanding (Wittgenstein, 2001). Emotional responses are initially sensible subjectively, but are shared objectively when expressed through discourse as a representation or behavior. This representation may then become associated to a goal, which behaves as a motivator for further

'like' behavior. The determination of what is sensible erects the parameters of what is capable of being understood, learned, and sensed where ultimately that which is sensed is capable of being known. Another individual can never understand another's emotion as a subjective feeling, but can grasp the form which it takes.

In the event of a shift in attention, the grand goal may not be dismissed altogether, but delayed or altered to accommodate the distraction if the interfering stimulus is deemed worthy of action. However, this distraction which had caught our attention, because of its importance to the self, will facilitate the representation of that memory relative to the context of that experience. As a corollary, retrieval of representations from that particular context defined by the working self, will extract rehearsed memories, given the allotted time and space of working memory, and inhibit the contending unrehearsed or less accessible representations of the context or other related contexts, assuming availability. Assuming the availability of all memories of a particular context without a finite amount of space and time, inhibition may seem to be rendered redundant. However, although having a finite amount of space of time, plus rehearsal and inhibition, may account for incidental learning; inhibition is a requisite of intentional learning. Inquiries summon insights and insights bestow further questions (Lonergan, 1978). Questions are referenced to a problem which presumes a referenced goal. In so far as further insights are relevant to the problem and therefore the goal, the inappropriate or irrelevant insights must be ignored in addition to environmental distracters that may thwart the progression and acquisition of the current goal altogether. The process of goal acquisition demands exceptional attention management, which presumes the use of active inhibition. Even if we had an infinite amount of time and space, inhibition would still be necessary for the ordering of the relevant from the irrelevant and the repression of the promulgated extraneous (Conway, 2001).

Understanding is formed upon representations of contexts. The particular representations of an individual understanding are composed of the most accessible contextually relevant sensory manifold now retrieved. This means that an understanding from 10 years ago and now, in regards to the same context, may possess different particulars (Conway, 2000a) not only due to alternate references, but also due to an updated understanding, manifold, goals, etc. The recollection of a contexts' particular involves a top-down progression, whereas matching a particular to a context is a bottom-up progression. The determined particulars of a context will

be those of the manifold that are most accessible now retrieved. The context itself is beyond the relation to a reference of time or space relative to that of a particular. The context may only be expressed through particulars, which represent the sensory manifold, because the context is the channel by which the water of a river flows (Hunt, 1981; Lonergan, 1978; and Wittgenstein, 2001). To determine whether a context or a particular is easier to retrieve will have to, according to my situational understanding, depend on the reference used to express or retrieve the target. Particulars are understood through an understood context and through a self-related context, a particular may be retrieved.

In the event of recalling particulars from two separate contexts, inhibition is accompanied by overlap in conception of particulars or competition. Thereby, from the perspective of a context or goal, as long as they are distinct, no two particulars are perceived competitive. However, on the other hand, from the perspective of the particular, two particulars in relation to two distinct contexts may be perceived competitive by generalization. A cued-recall using a stem of a particular, may thereby, produce competition through triggering bottom-up retrieval. However, the problem still stands when the context is given as a cue, because contexts are expressed through particulars. Despite retrieving in a top-down manner, the earlier rehearsal of particulars will compete for recall if they are compatible with the context and inhibition will ensue. The presence of an RIF effect will rest upon the individual's categorization of particulars to a context: Potentially isomorphic content will produce RIF, whereas disparate and incompatible content will impair the effect in so far as the referenced context is static. However, the risk cannot be prevented as long the particulars are made sensible while the contexts are active, because the mind incessantly assesses what it senses according to its contextual understanding and active goals without any externally directed forgetting and extraordinary control. The conditions for retrieval may be controlled in the event that new contexts are carefully learned in isolation to others through repeated practice and retrieval. Any other similarities, such as setting and instruction may be phased out in a similar fashion. Theoretically, according to quantitative reasoning, the same results may be obtained through averaging. Again, similarity breeds competition and its progeny, inhibition (Anderson, 2000). The variability among autobiographical contexts reveals deeper intricacies, but in return it extends the light to greater depths by positing further questions.

In brief, retrieval-induced forgetting, the content of autobiographical memories, and their pertinent contexts are penetrated and grounded by the principle that similar data is understood similarly. However, similar does not equate equivalence and beyond the merely physical analysis of data there is a psychological aspect. This psychological aspect grounded by emotional response provides a basis for the determination of contexts via an objective, which establishes a personal relation to the data. This psychological aspect is the primitive sense and most basic human law. The manifold contexts in relation to the sensory manifold produce variations in memories as the relation between context and particular varies. After all, a particular memory is a representation of a relation between a context and a particular at the time of retrieval.

Part Two: A Sketch of Conceptualization and a Preliminary Sketch of the Retrieval Heuristic Structure

Preface

This piece of work is more or less a delineation of a possibility of the process from abstraction to concretion and concretion to abstraction viz. causality. What it is that is trying to be expressed are not the particulars whereby it is delivered, but one's understanding upon which it is immediate received. This 'it' is feeling and what this feeling comes to mean in relation to the particulars is whatever the reader has conditioned it to mean. Unfortunately, I am only able to express things according to my understanding in accord to the particulars upon which I can sense them. Therefore, those that see things similar to the way I do would be the individuals that would most likely understanding that which is being expressed most similarly. As for everyone else, to whom that may conceive this work as 'fluff', I request one not to get caught up in frustration when reading this work. If it comes off as 'obscurant', understand it and accept it for that which you see it understandingly. When traveling through the forest, some choose the paved road while others choose the overgrown path.

I have intentionally left out sources in this section of the work because such activity whereby I give source contradicts that which this work presupposes. These ideas in their fundamentals have been dressed up differently time and time again; I suspect and hope that it will not end with me either, because I lack the wits to present these fundamentals in their naked form. If the reader is able to grasp the fundamentals which I have endeavored to express, then the

purpose of this work has been fulfilled: To supply satisfaction, enjoyment, and to act as guidance for more practical affairs. For the readers that wish to see where 'my influences' lie, I have presented a list of the most recent references for academic reasons.

In regard to this works critique on current methodology, the reader should keep in mind how and why 'my ideas' as being theirs come to mind. The line between the theoretical and practice or the atheoretical is obscurant.

Finally, as a consequent of the proposed perspective, this work, in regard to demonstrating its particulars, is one in development. Nonetheless, feeling as the fundamental constitutive element of 'doing' can not be denied. Feeling presupposes every action a human may make cognitively.

Introduction

What it is that we are to investigate is how conceptions come into being; how it is that we may think. What is in view by 'being' is an experience by which one possesses a sense for that something. From a common sense perspective, the experience one has with a chair and the experience one may have with a conception are different because the former is empirical whereas a conception is seemingly theoretical. However, this is not believed to be the case. It is postulated that feeling underlines both of these situations upon which what one perceives, as what is empirical, is primordially feeling. The seeing of a chair subsumes the conception of a chair. What is meant by 'think' is merely that which comes to mind. The term 'thinking' is used in its general, popular meaning as it's commonly understood. The act to 'think' as something apperceptive as in 'I am thinking' is conditioned by conditions; these conditions are manifold, but are manifold only in the manifold in so far as from the world of particularity. What this amounts to is that this understanding of the conditions of thinking being polymorphic is a perspective whereby the elements of such understanding, to the extent of unity, have not been disclosed as being phenomenal. Thereby, it may equally be said that the aim of this investigation is to bring to light to or to disclose the primordial basis of these 'taken for granted' and derived conditions of thinking.

The review of literature presented above may act as a suitable reference for the interpretation of the forthcoming analysis. Retrieval-induced forgetting and the effects of arousal

on attention linger like a phantom throughout the words of the investigation. The Self-Memory System, in so far as it being comprised of the knowledge base and working self, has contributed in part to many of the forthcoming concepts such the structure of the development and retrieval of conceptions. The memories which were mentioned earlier were primarily of the subtype 'autobiographical', however, in this analysis, as memories are concerned, all memories are assumed to be conceptions. In regard to the theorizing presented within the literature review, it is to serve as an example for the development of the forthcoming analysis, despite the inconsistencies which may be perceived between them. Again, this work on the development of conceptions is in itself a development.

The analysis will be split into four chapters. The first chapter deals with the foundations for the possibility of the self and elementals in a biological framework; the second chapter delineates the existence of the self as the foundation of understanding and the corollaries of such an assumption; the third chapter crosses over into cognition where feeling maintains its stance as the universal pull into taking-action where the multitude of meanings arise; chapter four is committed to the explanation of anticipation where we grasp how one may conceive; and finally the investigation reaches its end, in regard to this piece of work, with the coalescence of the aforementioned ideas, which postulates feeling generalization as the means by which one 'thinks' and the retrieval heuristic structure as the mechanism which subjugates such a means.

Chapter 1

To understand labyrinthine cognition or the mechanisms of such to the extent of systemizing *conceptualization*, a query into its laws is needed where conditions are conditioned. When dealing with cognition and its conceptions, the causality which may be apparent between entities as perceived may very well be subjective, which if looked at narrowly, posits a problem with reliability across the population or more generally, the context. What is needed as a foundation is a common, primordial ground shared by humans and perhaps, animals in general. Upon such a foundation, we may ascend into cognition where our founded claims permeate, penetrate, and underlie conceptualization or the possibilities for the conditions of conceptualization. Our discussion for the framework of how one thinks or more specifically how one conceptualizes will begin from a biological and chemical standpoint before transcending onto the turf of its derivatives. This does not mean that the discussion will go into

electrochemistry and the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, but more so to the basics existentially. In other words, we will proceed with conditions which do not subsume conceptualization in order to behave or act in the world. Conceptualization is the interpretation of what is understood to what is present before us where conceptions are the elements of knowing.

The governing and grounding precept for our investigation is that the laws which govern the superordinate affect the subordinate. The assumption follows that the cognitive is a subordinate of the biological, which in turn is a subordinate of the chemical. Thereby, our investigation begins in the biological to establish a framework for how humans may cognate the world.

Conditions for the Foundations for the Possibility of Self

How may an entity affect biological man (organism), which in turn triggers cognition? What could it be that conditions cognition and what are its constituents? Merely seeing a pen and beginning to write is laden with presuppositions where the pen possesses some qualities which correspond to the qualities and conditions of writing. These conditions which permit such an execution do not originate out of the blue, but are learned, conditioned. These conditions within the psychical realm may be presumed as conceptions; and if that is so then what is the initial condition or conception and the constituents which give rise to it? What it is that we are investigating are the primordial constituents of the basis of conceptualization, our concept of inquiry: The self as existing.

These constituents must be at the base of all conceptions, because no other conceptions come before it; meaning that these constituents must exist outside of cognition. If they were to exist exclusively within cognition then they would give rise to themselves where the question would then become one of tautology. Thereby, we are pointed in the direction of the biological to find these constituents; we are directed to a location upon which the most elemental conditions, knowing of self-existence may lay and where it may be necessarily conditioned by only biological conditions. Furthermore, like all reactions, these constituents must affect the organism, which may very well be composed of reactions upon other reactions. In addition, these constituents must be phenomenal or more specifically, physically experiential; and they must exist before the organism as being in its world before awareness. For the self to be perceived as

existing it must be disclosed as being phenomenal. Of course, if one were to categorize attention and consciousness as cognates of cognition, then our investigation would indeed be in vain if one were to interpret our method of inquiry to be independent of the functions of cognition. Again, what it is that we are inquiring about is the chemical and biological basis for the primordial conditions of conceptualization viz. the *elemental knowing*, context, and conception

What we may already deduce from our discussion is that conceptualization is a reaction where the conditioned are met by conditions. The void between the condition and the conditioned is filled by understanding, which infers that our concept of inquiry, as being conditioned, is filled by a primordial understanding, knowing. This may pose as a conundrum upon the recognition of the contradiction where understanding precedes itself, but we are discussing the basis of such notions; the concept of understanding is a derivative. Unfortunately, a discussion regarding the possibility of elementals when everything is conditional will not be discussed. Elementals in our discussion will be conditions assumed primordial enough to act as a basis for that which we wish to associate the elementals toward in context. Moreover, in the event one were to postulate that there aren't any 'true' origins, which is, albeit, a consequence of flexible parameters and indecision, the parameters of our discussion are restricted to the first instance whereby action does not necessitate cognition; and all elementals will arise from that instance forward. This will become clearer as we proceed, but to provide an immediate justification would entail the contents of our investigation. Now let us proceed.

To explain conception-less conditions is impossible, because explanation and understanding are bound in conceptions; causality is a product of understanding. However, this does not mean that we are not able to find invariants and to formulate a system by which all conceptions are to follow. What it does mean is that what will be discovered is limited to one's understanding. Despite what may seem as a futile attempt, the particulars of what is said serve merely as an anchor to what one may know so that one may interpret, as they fittingly understand, their universality. As we will see later on, interpretation, as a conscious activity, is referenced in concretion; therefore, our investigation for the possibility of understanding will be held in a condition of particulars where conceptions are not required, if it is at all possible. The first characteristic and condition for conceptualization to be discussed will be *arousal* followed by *aim* and *feeling* as substituents of arousal.

Foundations for the Possibility of Self

An entity may affect an organism through the elicitation of arousal, which is the rise of physiological readiness for action. Arousing entities, as that which elicits arousal, inflict sensation such as derived pain and pleasure. These sensations incur activities or involve activities within the organism, such as activation of the autonomic nervous system and the production of neurotransmitters. The automatic withdrawal of one's hand following the physical impact of a hot stove for example is an activity which takes place without the necessary interaction of cognition being apperceptive or conscious. Not only does this reflex take place at a nearly instantaneous speed whereby consciousness qua conceptualization lags behind, but also plants, such as the dionea muscipula, which do not possess the necessary organs that are believed to be attributable to cognition, possess similar reflexive reactions toward physical sensation. The organism is capable of taking action in the world without cognition on a purely biological and chemical means.

From a biological framework, arousing entities yield physical sensation as opposed to psychical sensation that ensues from cognition; and these sensibles as they affect the body sensationally are deemed basic feeling and conditions the possibility of disclosing elemental knowing. For our current topic feeling may be intuited as a sensation. The organism's response to arousal viz. reflex is the basic aim. One may stipulate that not all sensations elicit a natural reflex, which could very well be accurate, but could that be said without the intervention of knowing and conception? Is it not factual that one makes a response to this notion justification for what one is negating? Pleasure may be argued as an example where one would want to maintain sensation, however, pleasure presumes a reference such as pain and normalcy. The sensation that we feel is neither pain nor pleasure but mere sensation or feeling. Pleasure and pain are conceptions which come afterward in cognition; they are perceived cognitively after they are felt. Moreover, could a sensation which does not elicit a response (arousal) be considered a sensation? Again, we rely on cognition, but phenomenally, a sensation minus a response does not exist: A sensation is defined by its impact. Nonetheless, all sensation which arouses the organism involves a natural reflex to withdraw, which may be later overridden under cognition through knowing. The excitation from arousal and the subsequent reaction may be

intuited as the *moment* or situation where the elemental knowing as self-existing becomes phenomenal.

The reflex which follows arousal is a phenomenal action of the organism which does not necessarily presume any preconceptions beyond what is implicated by the elemental. This phenomenal reaction viz. reflex is the foundation for the basic aim: *Cease and Desist*. All basic feeling which arouses the organism sets forward the cease and desist action, which in our context is the immediate withdrawal from the *stimulus*. The only conditions where an organism would maintain contact after first contact would presuppose prior conceptions or preconceptions of such a stimulus and if the entity were to be non-arousing. Again, anything which elicits arousal in this sense, assuming no prior knowledge of such an entity, conditions a cease and desist response; or more generally, organisms naturally respond to arousing entities. Note: A stimulus in our case is an entity which has caused a reaction. Of course, to determine a stimulus requires conceptualization so we will call it an entity until we are ready to discuss stimulus as a conception.

The basic aim, as a constituent of the biological reaction and moment, is a means of achieving an end where the end is the cessation of the sensation, feeling. In our context the pulling away would be exemplified as a jerking motion from sensation. Another example would be the scratching of an itch; the disruption of an active sensory fiber by the activation of another sensory fiber. The reaction may be intuited as a rearrangement reaction where the reactant is sensation and given enough energy being arousal, the product is the basic aim; or more simply, arousal as reactant and aim as product. Inert (non-arousing) entities or true entities, relative to stimuli, do not phase the organism because they possess minimal levels of sensation; the organism is consequently indifferent towards the entity.

What we have thus far is a biological reaction of activity which does not require knowing beyond the elemental knowing, yet also displays itself phenomenally as an entity in the world. Other biological and chemical reactions occur such as the brains' absorption of oxygen via glucose via blood via the heart and so on and so forth, but these reactions are not immediately phenomenal qua containing sensibility. It is possible for a myocardial infarction or a stroke to manifest, which would more than likely elicit arousal and in such a case, assuming respiratory failure in association to the myocardial infarction where one reaches for their jugular,

similar conditions may be met. Curiously, instances where the organism's body elicits arousal upon itself are more likely to precede instances whereby one would come across an alien sensational entity, because such an instance whereby one is venturing is more likely to preclude a conception. For example, a human enfant is more likely to experience hunger pains and be fed by its caregiver upon crying before it has the opportunity for its head is to come across, lets say, the corner of a table in exploration. Regardless of the scenario, the conditions are still met: Basic feeling and the consequent basic aim as a phenomenal reflex. These conditions, biological constituents of conceptualization, and substituents of arousal give rise to the possibility and disclosure of an elemental knowing which hitherto had been obfuscated. Connoted by the term elemental, the existence of the self is the base of reference for all other knowledge where all other conceptions are its derivatives. How is basic aim and basic feeling the necessary conditions for the *elemental conception*; is the concept taken on faith in the sense that there are no other conceptions to base it on; and if a conception is a product of conceptualization, how is the elemental formed and what may understanding come to mean existentially? Before proceeding to answer these questions, let's conclude the present section that arousal discloses our elemental knowing of self whereby self existence becomes sensible as characterized earlier.

Chapter 2: The Existence of the Self as the Foundation of Understanding

Before proceeding to the discussion of the *elemental context*, it would not be amiss to spend a moment discussing the relative definition of conception because it would explain the necessity for arousal in the elemental. What does a conception mean and furthermore, what does it mean in relation to the elemental?

The Elemental Knowing in the Capacity of Arousal Delimited by Basic Feeling

A conception is a function of cognition, a representation of a presentation. A presentation at its most primitive level is a sensation which arouses the organism. A presentation may not be a single sensation but a collective, albeit the quantification of a sensation is indeed conceptual. What is presented to the organism, at this most primitive level, is the sensation of itself. From the organism's response or reflex to arousal, the most elementary presentation available is that of the entity of the self which evokes arousal whereby arousal is sourced from within the organism and not externally. Since no conceptions are available, a foreign or alien

object can't exist until self exists. An accusation postulating the opposite subsumes a sensation upon the organism; it is a representation of the presentation of a sensation as attributed by the self on the self.

To represent something presupposes one's attending-to that something, which is in essence nothing more than arousal from feeling; furthermore, this attending-to stands in so far as this something is present physically, empirically, superficially, and so forth. A presentation as sensation conditions a representation as a re-sensation; it represents the presentation to the extent of similar sensation. A presentation is a necessary condition for a representation and this presentation is and must exist phenomenally to the organism. This *phenomenality* of a sensation is the possibility of attending the self. In so far as phenomenality equates to existence as something being present so that one may attend-to something and that it is a condition for conceptualization whereby presentations are a necessary condition for a conception; the attending-to of the self as existing as a knowing discloses the presentation of other phenomena that affect the self in relation. Something can not cause pain or cause pleasure without a reference to that which the cause is directed toward. Again, the elemental knowing of self-existence as made possible by arousal makes possible conceptualization; and this is where our investigation may cross over into the cognitive realm as a realm of representations. The main discrepancy between the biological and cognitive is the multitude of meaning attributed to sensation.

Whether or not the individual (organism cognitively) is aware of its self in its own conception as existing in regard to the elemental knowing is irrelevant, the conception of the existence of the self is a knowing in its most primordial form, feeling. The elemental knowing is not a conception in the true sense as it being a representation, because there is no knowing which precedes it and therefore, representation is not a possibility. The existence of self is conceived conceptually through its derivatives; it is an elemental to the extent of a purely cognitive transcendental manifestation of sensation as feeling. Taken from this perspective, the elemental knowing of self-existence is taken on faith if by meaning faith one were to posit without knowing by means of a more primitive referential conception; as an absolute. What comes before sensation in the capacity of arousal as feeling? I can not possibly conceive such a condition.

Corollaries of Self-Existence as Being Made Possible by Arousal

Since all knowledge stems from the elemental knowing, the conditions which make the elemental possible, makes possible its derivatives according to our initial precept. Now if conceptualization is a function of active consciousness (apperception) as proposed, due to the necessity of attending-to something in order to draw representations, arousal then becomes a necessity to elicit apperception whereby conceptions, which demand a knowing, may be formed. This does not go on to mean that we must be actively conscious to retrieve memories or conceptions, but that one's representation of their immediate environment whether physically or psychically necessitates attention which is assumed to be a signifier of apperception. Ill let the reader construct an argument for the possibility of having attention towards something without being conscious of that which is attended to if they wish to do so. Anyways, if arousal conditions conceptualization and arousal is conditioned by that which causes arousal within the environment (stimuli), then conceptions themselves as being products of conceptualization are also conditioned by the environment or stimuli. Furthermore, if understanding is composed of conceptions, which presume knowing, as we have postulated earlier, understanding in essence is contextual. Since we have established the elemental knowing of self-existence on a condition as a basis for conceptualization, it too must have a context which, as a consequence of its penetrating characteristic in regard to its elemental property, has a defining characteristic on conceptualization. Although we have not discussed the effect of the basic aim on conceptualization in regard to the elemental knowing in the prior section, we will discuss its significance here in regard to context. However, before we venture into the topic of the context and the conception-of-the-moment subsuming context and elemental knowing, we will spend a passing on temporality and context as a corollary of our analysis hitherto.

The temporality of conceptualization may best be grasped by breaking it apart and starting from the ground up. From what has been said thus far that arousal cues apperception, the sensation or feeling following that arousal which prompts conceptualization, stands as a single moment. A moment is merely an instance of conceptualization characterized by feeling; a moment of conscious activity. The characterized feeling as we will see later on will come to take on multiple meanings, because sensation as feeling becomes conceptualized itself.

Conceptualization as a single instance occurs within a moment whereas conceptualization as a whole manifests in moments of the past, future, and present. All moments as conditioned by

arousal share the experience of self. However, conceptions as conceptions-of-the-moment are momentary or *provisional* to its particulars and the order or arrangement of these particulars. In other words, conceptions deal with the moment upon which they represent the presentation of that which elicited arousal. Seeing that conceptions comprise understanding and that representation presumes understanding qua interpretation where the individual appropriates that which is understood, context is understanding in the following ways: The individual understands entities according to moments, due to the basis of conceptualization; and specifically, understanding as a whole is a generalization of moments where similars are understood similarly transcendentally; otherwise, relative to the latter course, a conception of a moment would not exist beyond the instance of its creation. Without context, feeling is meaningless; that which gives meaning to feeling is context or primarily, the basic aim. Consequently, meaning is nothing without feeling whereby it's unfounded. Now we shall proceed to the context of a moment where the self is phenomenal in so far as what the self comes to mean existentially relative to the basic aim. What is the elementary existential basis of context?

Primordially, Arousal Comes to Mean Anxiety and Within-A-Moment or Existentially, it Equates Concern

The context where the self becomes phenomenal is in its response to sensation. This particular response in question is the basic aim, which is conditioned by arousal, which presumes feeling. The response behaves or exists as being phenomenal as a pulling away or fleeing from the feeling; or cease and desist. The cease and desist aim is a reflexive action against feeling as elicited by arousal. To the extent that the self is only experienced through arousal and reflex is a natural consequence of arousal, the self is also experienced as a teleological action towards or against feeling. Arousal brings the self to itself as fleeing.

Now one may inquiry that this reflex is not necessarily experienced and therefore not a necessary fundamental existential constituent of a conception. What it is that we are establishing is the possibility of the reflex or basic aim as the foundation for the possibility of context. It has been presumed earlier that without a context, conceptualization may not occur, because there is no reference to base interpretation which had been defined as the appropriation of that which is understood. Therefore, being as all conceptions are representations and interpretations, all conceptions are founded upon a context; and if all conceptions are founded so, then so must the

elemental. Context is necessary for conceptualization and at the very least it is experienced through presuming understanding. Our question is what the context of the elemental conception is whereby no other conceptions come before it and where understanding relative to conceptions has yet to be established. If understanding is context, then our investigation is into the biological basis of context. The basic aim in response to the basic feeling is a necessarily sufficient foundation for the possibility of context due to its association to feeling, its phenomenality, and independence from conceptualization. Biologically, the basic aim has been established to be comprised of a cease and desist action or a fleeing from sensation or feeling, which is the foundation of experience qua being merely sensible. The basic aim provides the potential of meaning for a feeling and within the elemental knowing of self-existence, the self is found to exist as pulling away from feeling.

The seemingly relational nature of context is given by the aim's relation to feeling, to self. The context of the moment where the self is phenomenal is the pulling away from feeling upon which the self exists in fleeing. The elemental context is the fleeing from feeling, from self. Thereby, the conceptions it form are in general relation to the fleeing from itself, the self. This goes to say that the individual's most elemental function in response to arousal is to flee from the sensation, which is at root itself; that entities with feeling hold significance for the individual in so far as the entities are eliciting arousal. Arousal gives the self to itself upon which the self is found fleeing. Now that we have established the elemental context for the elemental conception in so far as its significance to the individual, we may proceed to the meaning of the elemental context relative to elemental knowing: The elemental conception.

From the context of this moment, the elemental conception is anxiety and the response to this anxiety is *concern*. These representations of feeling and aim, anxiety and concern respectively, are within the context of the self existing in fleeing from fleeing. Anxiety and concern are equally primordial to feeling and aim in regard to understanding as context. The terms 'anxiety' and 'concern' were adopted to connote their relation to the elemental. Every conception, being derivatives of the elemental, presupposes anxiety and concern. Consequently, anxiety may be lumped in with concern as meaning concern maintains the characteristic of anxiety, but for the time being they will be treated separately so that we may achieve a more firm grasp.

Anxiety is the conceived feeling of the knowing of the self as it exists phenomenally in the world. It confesses to the self as existing in accord to the elemental context. It is ever present because it is the foundation of our understanding, which is fundamentally the context of the self. In fact the definition of what is conceptually present is that which contains anxiety. Anxiety motivates an individual to take action on a cognitive level just like feeling on a biological/physical level. Moreover, unlike the biological level, anxiety can invoke arousal without a direct physical entity. That which elicits physical arousal such as pain is conceived in a state of anxiety; pain as a conception and its perceived source of anxiety as a conception is the base from which we flee as had been conditioned by the basic aim. Conceptions permit control over anxiety by the *anticipation* of it. A needle, if held improperly, may elicit arousal and cue a cease and desist action; however a conception of a held needle causing sensation cues a similar response viz. avoiding the conditions which may elicit sensation. The action which prevented the individual from coming into contact with the needle was not prompted by a biological feeling directly, but by anxiety via conception. Conceptions, being a compound of aim and feeling, maintain their feeling as anxiety. A conception as a representation possesses anxiety in regard to how particulars inflict feeling on the self by which the conception was constituted. Anxiety exists in conceptions or through conceptualization exclusively. In the world of conceptions, a stimulus is an entity which holds anxiety, whereas a pure entity maintains the potential to hold anxiety.

Conception as a meaning adopts anxiety in relation to the idealized aim of the moment in the capacity of the executed action's effect on anxiety relative to the aim in so far as lessening anxiety, intensifying anxiety, or having no effect. Of course, this assumed effect is a conception pertaining to the correlation of a feeling now, after one has taken action, to a feeling of then, which had been assumed a priori pertinent. However, since the elemental concept is elemental, no other conceptions precede it, therefore it has no reference to base its calibration; its meaning is absolute anxiety. Curiously, the numerical meaning of a conception is nothing more than an exaggeration stressed by context. In so far as the elemental presupposes all other conceptions and its anxiety is absolute, the comparison of anxiety levels of consequent conceptions is an exaggeration of context, a generalization. This is a product of the operating principle of understanding where similars are understood similarly.

A conception is a vessel of anxiety, but a concern is how that anxiety is encapsulated. From what has been said earlier, the individual exists in a moment which is defined by present particulars and the arrangement of these particulars in proximity of the individual. The basic aim as a reflex to feeling is expressed in a multitude of ways in the world. Entities are interpreted in relation to what is present conceptually and physically, which gives rise to concerns (plural) to account for and deal with the multitude of relations and combinations. Anxiety penetrates every aspect of our world, but the form or shape by which it manifests is polymorphic; and to deal with this multitude calls for a variety of means to achieve a common end. Concern is an instance of anxiety among particulars, context. It defines context and the ways particulars are conceived by defining conceptions which in turn constitute context. Primordially, concern exists as the fleeing from anxiety as a doing, but particularly, concern may manifest as to consider, defend, justify, assail, etc.

Recapitulation: The Existential Fundamentals of Conceptualization

The self exists phenomenally in its world through sensation or specifically, arousal. In the moments where self experiences itself, the self naturally reacts or responds to this arousal. The reason why it responds to arousal is a presumable survival trait. Nonetheless, within an instance where the self is experienced or from an alternate although derived viewpoint, the world as experienced, the basis of knowing is grounded as anxiety. The self exists in the world of its understanding as a primordial context of itself and lives in the world of its concern whereby all actions which one phenomenally lives is a response to arousal or anxiety where anxiety holds the potential to arouse. Now contingent on the context, this may be interpreted differently, but all interpretations are grounded upon this structure of the elemental context. Our bodies function upon reactions to conditions where conditions are to be met and our understanding in so far as conceptualization does so equally.

Understanding as mentioned earlier is contextual; bound by a single, most general context, being what understanding is plainly, the context of self. The self exists in moments of particularity and upon such conditions, the self is phenomenal and understood in these moments of particularity; and this is where cognition becomes convoluted if one were to dwell within the particular. The existential basis of understanding is the elemental context of the moment where arousal elicits a response which yields anxiety. Unfortunately, as to the particular details between

these two phases, I must confess ignorance to this inquiry of creation. Perhaps the potential to develop the elemental conception whereby the self exists in phenomenality is innate. Regardless, this elemental knowing as standing solely, is not a conception in the popular sense, but a knowing, a tiny flame that when given oxygen and tinder it may expand to that of what understanding is currently. However, the elemental conception of the self which exists phenomenally in the fleeing from feeling takes on the term conception upon the recognition of the conditions of conceptualization as they exist primordially. The elemental knowing is not necessarily intelligible on its own in so far as a being a conception of …, however without it the elemental context and conception are not possible: It is the ultimate preconception. The elemental knowing may also be intuited as a potential; something that may be filled when conditions are met. The perceptible quandary here is equal in nature to the authority of authorities, universal meaning, and the existence of god. Nonetheless, notwithstanding this wall, our investigation of conceptualization accounts for these barriers as will later be disclosed. We have digressed long enough; let's proceed forward with the recapitulation.

Relative to the elemental context, anxiety arises with arousal where one's response to it presumes concern. Anxiety is a psychical sensation, a representation of a physical sensation relative to the self against itself as not knowing. Anxiety is not fear, which presupposes a something particular, a conception, by which one expects. Fear is a derivative of anxiety. Despite one's concern for fleeing from anxiety as fleeing from feeling of self, it flees from that which it can't indefinitely. The individual 'flees' from anxiety by becoming lost in its world, by conceptualizing. However, even when trying to become lost, the self is rediscovered, because the world of the individual is its understanding. But, as we will see later on, the self finds itself, as being aroused, in that which it is not understood. It must be understood that the 'fleeing' we are referring to is not a disparaging term as a variable of cowardice, but rather in the sense of coming to an end. Anxiety is to be understood as feeling in association to the consequent fleeing; as the elemental conception of the elemental context; and as being conceptual. To the extent anxiety is a conception, it has feeling. Anxiety will be further elucidated within the subsequent chapters.

Understanding is composed of conceptions where conceptions are active representations that presume arousal; and that which molds conceptions from feeling is concern. Concern is how one appropriates what is understood in interpreting the moment. What is immediately felt within

the current moment is not yet understood beyond immediate anxiety, but concern as a reflex to arousal makes possible understanding by anchoring what is known to the moment. Concern, rooted in anxiety, is expressed within a moment as a taking-action. One exists in its world, through which they act, in concern for anxiety. Concerns are particularized derivatives of aim of the elemental: Fleeing from feeling. They are a means of keeping anxiety or feeling at bay, a means of conceptualizing. Concern is the conceptual response to anxiety; a mode of dealing-with by taking-action.

Arousal initiates the basic aim where conceptions are formed to understand our moment. What 'to understand' means is to draw relations between what is known and what one wants to achieve within a moment where the particulars of what's known and what one wants to achieve are provisioned by the moment. However, that which is known and that which one wants to achieve is invariantly, feeling. The agreement and disagreement of a conception (what is sensational) with concern (an anticipatory understanding) as something which turns against a targeted anxiety depends on the relation of feeling between the two provisioned by the moment. Now we turn our attention toward the dynamics of anxiety in cognition within the capacity of the interaction between preconception as what is presupposed understood and conceptualization as the interpretation of the moment's particulars and their arrangements. The dynamism takes on perplexity under the assumption that each moment is unique, which predicates unique or varied interpretations.

Chapter 3: Feeling as the Universal Pull into Taking-Action

A knowing or simply, knowing, is a projection of the self into the world before conceptualization and arousal. Interpretation presupposes this knowing in what is already understood. Knowing is assumed to be understood via preconceptions, which is makes possible conceptualization for being the basis of one is able to conceptualize. Conceptualization is a means of forming conceptions for the dealing with anxiety as predicated by these assumptions and the aforementioned characteristics. One takes action when dealing with anxiety to fulfill the purpose of dealing with anxiety to some perceivable extent. What is this extent which one aims to reach and how does it affect conceptualization as a process? In order to answer this two part question it would be prudent to interpret conceptualization as a conception upon which we may conceive the general operation of conceptualization as a teleological function. This chapter is

committed to the elucidation of feeling or *inanxiety* as the ideal state of experience which one strives to reach; and the maintenance of feeling viz. *amending* through conceptualization.

Where Knowing Founds Anxiety-Within-the-Moment, Conception-of-the-Moment Founds Inanxiety

Conceptualization is essentially a response to feeling in itself. It is a product of arousal which presumes anxiety or more primarily, feeling. The conditions which warrant the engagement of conceptualization must subsume a sensibility and a reason or concern for reacting or responding to this sensibility where, in accord to the elemental context, actions as responses are teleological. Since conceptualization is a cognitive function in so far as being a relation to knowing, the concern must be within the knowing as understood and thereby, we may assume our elementals and anxiety; so let's postulate a desire to know that which affects us as the universal aim of conceptualization. The interpretation of 'a desire to know that which affects us' may be expressed according to what we have investigated thus far: A 'desire' is a drive toward something which relates to our interpretation of the basic aim and elemental context whereby one flees from feeling; 'To know' is interpreted in relation to the product of conceptualization, being a conception, which constitutes our understanding and presumes our elemental knowing; and 'that which affects us' assumes a sensation, which we have already disclosed as feeling. Consequently, since we have already stated that feeling is a condition of conceptualization, we may drop 'that which affects us' leaving 'a desire to know'. Of course, a desire-to-know is a conception and thereby a manifestation of anxiety relative to our provisional understanding where we may merely state anxiety as the sole condition for the conditioning of conceptualization, but for the purpose of facilitated demonstration, a desire-to-know will be used as a co-condition for conceptualization.

Desire-to-know manifests particularly as concern to the extent of self affirmation. What is meant by 'particularly' is within-the-moment as experienced, whereas to state the opposite: the desire-to-know manifests primordially as a component of anxiety where the self is experienced in fleeing from feeling. A concern as previously characterized exists in relation to anxiety-within-the-moment which exists as something particular, concrete where the concern is in direct relation to the interpretation of that anxiety-within-the moment. Now, from what will be said in the following chapter, the concern is a knowing which assumes or anticipates a solution

or experience of having fled from feeling. A concern is therefore a projection of understanding into the moment and since the concern is a knowing which posits a state of having fled from feeling, the self within the present moment is in acquisition of self-affirmation, which if acquired, achieves its ideal state of self-affirmation. Self-affirmation being the end to which the aim or particularly, the concern wishes to achieve is the ideal experience of feeling. Now this ideal experience is the opposite of anxiety although being founded upon anxiety; it is inanxiety. The sensation of self-affirmation is a sensation of self, but of self as calibrated, aligned with its world, which is a world conceptualized. If anxiety, as that which we flee, were to exist in relation to this experience where self-affirmation is sensed, then it is most distant from the self or merely not attended to. Inanxiety is the general objective of conceptualization. Existentially, inanxiety is an experience where arousal may manifest again, but in a new form, concern, and moment; when the attended-to feeling or concerned conceptualized feeling loses its potency from over stimulation where the focus that one had on such a concerned conceptualized feeling begins to diminish and becomes vulnerable for reallocation.

In regard to the other condition of conceptualization, feeling must be disclosed before any form of cognition may begin in so far as cognition is a faculty of knowing. This is not to say that one must be aroused to 'know', but that knowing as that which contains feeling must be present before we understand, interpret, conceptualize, reason, etc. The world which one sees is that which has been conceptualized. In this world, to the extent that one acts, one acts conditionally and in teleological manner. However, in order to 'know' a moment as to conceptualize it, as to act upon it, then it must be conditioned by arousal where the self is brought before itself; otherwise, without arousal, the self is lost in the world it has conceived. Regardless, feeling is the most elementary form of sensibility and link to understanding. Assuming that inanxiety is a derived state of anxiety, feeling brings the self to its self in its world which causes a repulsion that constitutes what we have referred to earlier as the fleeing from feeling. Now the self may be brought outside of its world, but to the extent that it flees as to rectify feeling, it must do so from within the moment of arousal within its world of particularity. Thereby, even though it is brought out of its 'hiding place', it can only return to and to 'hide' again within the world that it came. Anyways, inanxiety from this perspective would be an idealized, conceptual experience of expected feeling where fundamentally, inanxiety presumes a

knowing of anticipated anxiety. Again, without getting ahead of ourselves, anticipation will be discussed in the following chapter.

Moving on, after the first exposure to the conditions which elicit arousal and the consequent conceptualization, the probability of feeling eliciting arousal, as understood relative to interpretation, is reduced. Healthy conceptualization has a desensitizing effect on the individual. Although, it is possible for a conception to raise more concerns, the intention of conceptualization is to calibrate the self to its world as it understands itself within the moment; whereby presuming an instance of arousal, the self was not as calibrated as one had expected. Note: The adjective 'healthy' was used to connote the confession that meaning is relative to interpretation. The purpose of explanation here is to grasp the structure or system from the arrangement of particulars.

Conceptions as Amendments to Self Constitution

The self in its world, for as long as it is involved, is involved in its concern as pertaining to the moment which it knows. To be involved is to be taking-action where every action presupposes a condition whereby this particular action is a response to that condition. Assuming that an action is an activity or choice, including the choice not to act; and its counterpart is inactivity, then arousal is a necessity for activity and thereby a condition for action in so far as being a concomitant result in action itself or that which makes possible action. Concern is disclosed to consciousness during conceptualization by arousal as a means to self affirm. It functions as a context whereby it delimits conceptualization according to what may be understood in association to interpretation. Consequently, the self as being in its world is defined by its concern in which concern is that which molds feeling into conception which comprises a provisional knowing.

A conception being the product of conceptualization is also a product of one's concern; a conception is of particulars relative to the moment relative to the concern. To the extent that a moment is defined or given meaning by the concern to the capacity of that which is conceptualized, conceptions are provisional or temporal. Conceptions are temporal because they are in relation to a particular moment under a particular concern whereby no two moments are identical. Consequently, no two conceptions are identical because of the uniqueness of each

moment upon which they are conditioned. Conceptions are at best, like one another on a concrete level. Conceptions are provisional. Likewise, to the limit that the self is conceived, the self is provisional because it's experienced in moments which are particular and unique. Moreover, since knowing is never absolutely calibrated with the moment in so far as possibilities, anxiety or inanxiety is a matter of exaggeration. Conceptions of prior moments are not perfect fits for other moments, meaning that every 'moment' (moment in the general sense) holds the potential to possess arousal; where arousal is a necessary condition for conceptualization, which in turn conditions the constituents of understanding, understanding develops as temporality progresses moment by moment. In example consider cleaning as a response to the anxiety which arises from a particular which contains filth. The means by which we clean a tile floor, carpeted floor, ones own body, automobile, etc are not identical. Of course, the verb 'scrub' could sufficiently cover all this situations, but in concretion would one go about scrubbing these equally?

Conceptions are not just particular provisional representations of presentation where presentation is nothing less than feeling, but they serve as a means of amending or constituting anxiety-of-the-moment. They are intellectualized feeling relative to interpretation which rests upon understanding. In so far as we act on the premise of fleeing feeling, conceptions, as a form of taking action, are generated with the intention to prevent recurrence of anxious situations whereby anxiety arises. Anxiety as a sensation is an exaggeration of inadequate calibration of interpretation which is presumed by the moment whereby the most accessible pre-conception qua context acts as reference. To the extent that a conception is defined in relation to the particulars and the arrangement of presented particulars, anxiety is conceived in a situation and therefore, anxious situation. Furthermore, in this manner conceptions are an evolutionary derivative; a response to feeling.

The environment of the individual does not remain static, but is moving due to interpretation of a moment to the extent of that which is presented. The conditions by which we clean are not always the same where the variables in what, where, and how we clean for example, vary. Situations whereby a conception, such as a concern is elicited, but the conditions for its execution are lack, enhances anxiety by negating the self in its knowing. How does one overcome anxious situations or simply, arousal altogether? One establishes a relationship between the initial concern and the momentary particulars, called amending. Amending is the

manipulation, including addition and subtraction, of relations in a heuristic retrieval structure whereby anticipation is facilitated. In other words, it is the recalibration of one's knowing of the environment that is a conscious activity in so far as that arousal preconditions conceptualization. Amending is the end to which conceptualization motions upon being set in motion by anxiety found in itself within its world. Conceptualization is the act of amending understanding, fueled by anxiety. Why does it amend? The answer is that it's the nature, habit of understanding as conditioned by the elementals. The individual naturally responds to arousal where the end is the loss of feeling which had sparked that arousal. The ultimate end is the loss of all feeling: Death. Since the individual lives in a world conceptualized, conceptions are a means of responding to feeling, following the same elemental mechanics.

Summary

The self in world, the world as it is conceptualized, is taking action against feeling. Actions, whether or not intentional, reflexive, or conceptual presuppose arousal whereby feeling is experienced. The world as it exists to the individual is a product of the individual fleeing from feeling. The feeling that it flees from does not need to be directly sensed as in an instance whereby one experiences a physical sensation, but the representation of such a sensation where it is assumed to be immanent and nearby, in the form of anxiety, is sufficient to initiate arousal. Anxiety that is perceived as close and immanent possesses greater priority in so far as being more likely to arouse than something distant, as not yet in the moment with these particulars. Nonetheless, although all conceptions, being intellectualized feeling are founded upon anxiety, they are positioned against anxiety in relation to a concern which is the dealing of an instance of anxiety as particularized within-the-moment. Now the direction of force or source of gravity of this pull which has been attributed to the self by feeling may be conceptualized as an ideal state of experience called inanxiety. However, in reality, inanxiety may be nothing more than replacing one anxiety for another. Within-the-moment the attention of the individual is maintained by a particular which is assumed to have been the source of arousal or in association to, such as the response. The anxiety-of-the moment exists in relation to the interpretation of that which is within the moment. Attention is a double-edged sword, which narrows our sight and consequently inhibits other possibilities from coming forth; similar to the effect of addiction,

obsession, and infatuation. Again, interpretation is the appropriation of that which is understood where understanding, being the capacity of that which is understood, is anchored in the moment.

Although the self exists in the world as taking action against feeling, one does not feel this to be a static state, because the individual also operates from within a rest state, which although primordially assumes arousal, does not necessitate active consciousness in the moment of its manifestation: Active consciousness as that which is requisite for conceptualization functions from a state of work. The individual in a state of rest may be intuited to function unconsciously or automatically where conditions are favorable for such activity whereby arousal does not subsist. A state of work is a state of amending, whereas a state of rest is a state of tarrying. What is it that makes one able to operate within a state of rest? What we know now is that the individual lives in the world of its concern, of its understanding; and that arousal may also manifests in accord to knowing within-the-moment. To the extent that arousal can be conditioned by interpretation in so far as conceptual arousal, understanding or knowing is a condition of such arousal, which posits arousal as conditioned by understanding qua in the world of the self which exists as interpreted.

When one interprets the world, one projects the self before oneself. One interprets that which it already knows which is nothing more than the relation of entities to the entity of the self. The projection of the self before it is anticipation and when anticipation fails, being that what manifests within the moment is unexpected, the self is experienced primordially and anxiety ensues. Upon such a situation, the individual is aroused and enters a state of work whereby it engages in amending the self and understanding through the production of conceptions in accord to the knowing already established in so far as being assumed in the moment. Feeling as that which is ultimately sensible is that which instigates conceptualization in lieu of recalibrating the self with its supposed environment. Feeling instigates learning and this learning or amending that manifests is the realigning of the scope of our anticipation.

In the chapter to come we will present a sketch of anticipation as the projection of understanding; the possibility of arousal in a world of anticipatory knowing; the delineation of the tendency of understanding to operate in routine-like manner; and finally, a description of the heuristic retrieval structure and that which has influence over it.

Chapter 4: A Sketch of Anticipation as the Emergent Expression of Feeling

Hitherto, our perspective postulates that feeling, being primordially sensation, elicits arousal; and upon arousal, the self as existing becomes phenomenal where it's to act against feeling, the sensation, as fleeing from feeling in accord to the context, being the arrangement of sensible particulars, which is at this level nothing more than the self. The conception of this moment, whereby conscious activity occurs, is the meaning of feeling relative to the context: Anxiety. This action against feeling is a response as reaction to feeling and nothing more; and in this sense it is fleeing. It is fleeing because the response is to bring the arousing sensation, which had elicited the reaction, to an end. Within the moment, the self is concomitantly conceived as existing and fleeing; and this conception of anxiety becomes the foundation for further conceptions. However, even the biological instance which we have investigated is not completely without cognition as without knowing. A knowing, as a potential in its most elemental form, is present which permits the conceptualization of anxiety and that is the knowing of the self as existing. What this elemental knowing entails is uncertain, but prior to any conceptions subsuming the elemental conception it maintains no details of the self relative to the world. The elemental knowing is merely a potential. Our grand question for this chapter is how does arousal occur? We have said feeling or sensation excites arousal, but that, depending on one's understanding, is too narrow or broad; in our case it is too broad. The question may be rephrased: How is feeling expressed in the world which elicits arousal? The answer is anticipation or more specifically, the projection of understanding where the world of the individual is that of its understanding.

Knowing Dictates Feeling

It now becomes clear that the investigation is an inquiry about the mechanics of understanding where fortunately, all of the pieces which constitute the solution have already been mentioned. In so far as anticipation, conceptualization is the development of conceptions which in turn expands knowing. Conceptualization is a process that takes form during apperception or consciousness which presupposes arousal. Within the environment of the individual which conceptualizes, stimuli are beings which elicit arousal. How do stimuli invoke feeling? Or, in other words, how do stimuli, which contain feeling, disclose their feeling to the individual in so far as eliciting arousal?

In the earlier chapters we have called stimuli arousing entities because a stimulus presupposes a conception whereby at that moment in our investigation we were not ready to understanding knowing in such a broad context as to grasp such entities as stimuli in the context that they are invariably. A stimulus does indeed presuppose a knowing and that knowing during the biological reaction of activity as characterized earlier is the knowing of the self as existing. This elemental knowing makes possible arousal which makes possible conceptualization. The elemental knowing is a biological constituent of the knowing that makes possible the knowing of cognition. It may be easier to grasp if one were to recognize that cognition does not tend to arise out of the blue, but comes to be, as develops, from a more primordially form, which is the biological. This goes to say that every being which feels possesses this biological elemental knowing; one feels because one exists. What is meant by feeling or sensation is not merely physical sensation, but the general meaning of sensation. When I look at a tree, such activity presupposes feeling. Of course, this particular sort of feeling is more complex and its origin is the topic of our investigation, but the same principles apply. Nonetheless, stimuli are what they are because of our understanding, including their potential to be as founded by knowing.

A stimulus, in the general sense, invokes feeling because one has given it the possibility from prior interpretation which had consequently extended knowing. Interpretation, which is comprised of pre-conceptions, assumes a similarity which gives stimuli the capacity to invoke feeling. The disclosure of a stimulus presumes a relationship to the context and concern at hand. However, this assumption is not necessarily accurate whereby the context as understood may be unexpected. When understanding as knowing projects itself unexpectedly in this manner, the self becomes aware of the self through a stimulus and conceptualization is enabled. In return, a conception can be made to accommodate the inconsistency upon which reducing the feeling that had elicited arousal under those particular conditions. Arousal becomes a possibility in anticipation due to *imperfect calibration* between moments and conceptions. A pink elephant in the subway will draw attention, but it does so because it's understood that a pink elephant is not common to the subway despite its color. One's sensitivity to arousal by means of imperfect calibration rests upon the depth of the knowing or particularity of the concern. Preoccupation, such as a concurrent work-state, as an influence on arousal sensitivity will not be discussed. However, make note that attention also possesses an inhibitory characteristic as described earlier.

Attention may heighten one's awareness to the stimulus at hand, but in return it is blinded to a greater degree toward peripheral and unnecessary stimuli than when one is inattentive.

Conceptualization is the Process by which Knowing Expands

Conceptualization as a response is oriented against the feeling which had elicited the arousal in so far as being a reaction; the feeling which had elicited the arousal was anticipated, albeit unexpectedly, in regard to the moment of arousal by knowing in regard to concern. Upon arousal which presumes a knowing, other pre-conceptions are disclosed with similarly anticipated feeling which constitutes the perceived context of the moment. This may be easier intuited if one were to position their perspective from the notion that understanding as knowing is always positioned ahead of the individual where anticipation becomes phenomenal when one's expectation as that which is projected does not fit the form of the arrangement of particulars as currently understood; things are understood relatively. Furthermore, the individual lives its life in its concern where at the most basic level its concern is anxiety. Anyways, upon arousal, the self is put into the moment and that which is anticipated is conceptualized relative to the concern until further arousal. From this perspective, arousal may represent one's lack of knowing whereby one's lack of arousal may represent a lack of concern. However, a discussion about the particulars which may or may not give rise to arousal is beyond this investigation. What it is that we are currently interested in is how knowing affects arousal and how arousal affects knowing.

The projected knowing found to be poorly calibrated with the environment is perceived so because of the knowing itself. That which is anticipated is projected before the individual in accord to the concern. The concern itself represents a particular feeling or more specifically an inanxiety. The particular feeling it holds is grounded by the moment it wishes to represent in reality within the moment. Any feeling, as represented in the past, which stands against this held desired inanxiety of the concern is cause for arousal as a form of resistance. Now, it has been expressed that a moment is a lapse of conscious activity initiated by arousal and that a change in concern may more or less cause a change in moment. However, in the world of the individual which lives by its concerns, not all changes in activity, although unconsciously, prompt a moment as expressed earlier. This phenomenon whereby concerns and moments shift without arousal is part of a routine. For the purpose of this discussion, a moment within a routine or more specifically an unconscious shift in concern which does not elicit arousal will be referred to a

meta-moment. Moreover, strictly speaking, in regard to the definition as postulated earlier regarding a moment, a meta-moment is not a moment. Routines will be discussed in the following section.

A conception being the intelligibility of particulars as they affect the self within the moment is in essence a representation of the feeling idealized by the concern of that moment. Of course, all conceptions and concerns are bound to the elementals, but in the world of the individual, the individual is lost and preoccupied with these particulars. To the extent that conceptions are to represent inanxiety, they are equally representative of anxiety: A conception out of context is an imperfect calibration and warrants amending. The limit to which an entity becomes a stimulus is conditioned by knowing in association to concern and one's sensitivity to feeling or feeling sensitivity. This goes to say that *state of mind*, as being that which affects feeling sensitivity, affects the understanding of the individual to the extent that one becomes more resistant toward perceived foreign feeling. Consequently, this 'state of mind' whereby one rejects in so far as blocks out foreign feeling relative to the concern is an exaggerated response to feeling. Naturally, knowing precedes such an exaggeration, but given the context and its elicitation, conceptualization whereby one amends to accommodate does not occur, but rather conceptualization whereby one stands defensively and fortifies its knowing against that which it perceives to be assailing the self. A stimulus being that which arouses is no different. The individual exists in the way it attributes anxiety. Since anticipation is the projection of understanding, which is comprised of conceptions or more specifically, pre-conceptions; and conceptions are intelligible feeling, arousal is a characteristic of understanding. Within the world as being particular, arousal is contextual and the resistance one perceives is an exaggeration of context according to knowing. The closer an individual is to inanxiety as a state of mind, the more accommodating it is toward conceptions; whereas the closer it is toward anxiety as a state of mind, the more defensive it is toward conceptions or feeling. Compliments and insults will affect one insecure about that subject matter more so than an individual that is secure about that same subject matter.

In a hypothetical world where particulars and their arrangement are consistent, one may deal with anxiety in a single manner and need not necessitate a diverse knowing. However, the world is, according to the individual's interaction with it, is polymorphic and phantasmagoric.

Given an instance where the particulars and their arrangement are rather consistent, one's state of mind predicated by prior events as an overall feeling of living holds the potential to generate resistance and the consequent arousal. One's current state of mind affects the feeling sensitivity of the individual in so far as invoking arousal; and the nature of the concern used to deal with anxiety. Arousal does not result from inaccurate projection of knowing into the world, but the recognition of the knowing as being inaccurate or unexpected. Not only must one possess this knowing, but they must also be sensitive to its feeling as being sensation before them in the now. Could state of mind affect anticipation in so far as influencing that which is projected? Such a question is deceptive because that which 'is' projected is determined by conceptualization upon which arousal has already occurred. In such a case where the 'is' is realized then state of mind has already played its role.

The reader may come to the idea that the proposed perspective will lead one into a cycle whereby knowing as it's projected in regard to one's concern fails to excite arousal; where knowing is perceived to be perfectly calibrated with its environment; and where the state of mind remains stagnant due to prolonged periods of minimal arousal. Within such conditions it may be seen that understanding maintains a tendency toward routine.

Anticipation Anticipates Routine

Where fleeing from anxiety is the all-inclusive aim and understanding is the basis of self in regard to the aim, one develops an attraction to the world it has made against anxiety and therefore, presuming, free from anxiety or merely, inanxiety. This tendency is what will be called routine; it is the end goal, which is only realistically possible, for an indefinite amount of time, in death. However, this does not go on to mean that understanding's ideal state of being for the self is not possible. If the conditions permit, the individual will fall into a routine. What are these conditions and how is routine an intrinsic tendency of understanding?

A routine manifests when anticipation does not get disrupted. It is the balance or a perceived perfect calibration between understanding as knowing and the environment in so far as the arrangement of its particulars. Within a routine there are not moments but meta-moments whereby concerns vary according to tradition, schedule, habit, ritual, or pattern. To equate routine to the rest state as characterized earlier would not be necessarily accurate, because a

routine is not without a particular concern; one does not tarry in a routine although in comparison to a work state the efficiency whereby one acts may seem unproductive. Consequently, because a routine does not elicit arousal, it is not phenomenal until after the fact in relation to a subsequent moment. The feeling of a routine is no feeling, because one is not able to experience it directly. However, in regard to the utter lack of feeling, routine would be the epitome of inanxiety. If one were to postulate that the balance between knowing and the order of particulars is happiness, then one could adduce happiness as routine. This analogy is fitting because a routine is something that understanding strives for through conceptualization where amending occurs in relation to what is known, in which conceptualization itself is conditioned by an imbalance between knowing and the order of particulars. In so far as conceptualization strives for contentment, which is only supposed when anticipation goes as planned, and where happiness is conceived as a contentment then happiness is never experienced as being phenomenal, but assumingly lived without feeling concerned. To the extent that the experience of the self presupposes a concern and contentment represents being (being in a general sense) without concern, death is absolute contentment. Let's suppose happiness as 'finding joy in life': If by 'finding joy' one were to interpret it to mean conceptualization as being the calibration of order of particulars with understanding, then such happiness would be the coming-to of happiness not happiness itself. Anyways, a routine is the structure of knowing which is projected before the individual. The possibility of realizing routine is through arousal in knowing. In so far as happiness being a feeling, then it is realized through broken routine where one mends faulty relations. Routine is based within the biological elemental and realized in the cognitive particular. In regard to routine as successful anticipation, that which is anticipated or the immediate preparatory particulars or conceptions of knowing as projected by understanding is an operation of a retrieval heuristic structure. Within the next section we will attempt to sketch out what the retrieval heuristic structure is in so far as its purpose and the mechanics by which it functions.

Human Understanding as a Retrieval Heuristic Structure

The retrieval heuristic structure may best be summed up with two words: Generalization and accessibility where generalization refers to the broadening of context and applicability from particular moments; and where accessibility is the mere selection of pre-conceptions which are most readily accessible. Accessibility may be intuited as an aspect of

generalization as the generalization of temporality, but for our purposes we will suppose it as the former upon the principle that time incurs changes. The retrieval heuristic structure is more or less a template of knowing of conditioned preset pre-conceptions in accord to the concern. Its content is conditioned by accessibility and its application into the moment or meta-moment is generalization.

What knowing assumes is a generalization and that which it assumes is due to accessibility. In the broadest sense understanding generalizes feeling across moments; it assumes its conceptions with rather universal applicability. This assumption is what later comes to be known as the condition of arousal via anticipation. Moreover, all things abstract, as being general, in so far as they are sensible qua containing feeling are founded in a moment in all of its particular glory. Conversely, all things known in the moment are generalized and thereby abstracted. In example, by saying that this so and so object exists right here before me is an abstraction given knowing. However, to the extent that this so and so object exists, it is sensed or maintains feeling which constitutes concretion and particularity in so far as sensation. The subject that is generalized is in essence feeling, but bare feeling without meaning does not explain the world of one's provisional understanding. Thereby, the feeling generalized comes in a more seemingly tangible form as conception which holds meaning of feeling relative to self in the moment; and this tangible form that feeling assumes is colored by the world now understood. However, this altercation whereby feeling is transcribed is not a necessity, but conditioned. Why would one choose to particularize their feeling? One reason would be for discourse.

The projection of bare feeling, of self as existing, would only be arousing in a situation of physical sensation such as a hot stove. However, once feeling is given provisional meaning, projection into a moment becomes hit or miss where misses entail arousal. However, for something to hit or miss presumes a content of some sort whereby there is some detail of differentiation. The particularity that is selected and generalized is that which is most accessible relative to the concern. The particular that 'comes to mind most readily' is one that is either 'already on the mind' or one that most frequently 'inhabits the mind'. The particulars which are most accessible constitute familiarity. Within a projection, the particulars which are most familiar are projected first. If the concern or context is foreign, depending on how one conceives such an environment in so far as anxiety, arousal may ensue where amending may occur. Within

the work state, one is able to venture from the template for as long attention is held steadily; over time, once the attentional grasp diminishes templates of content whereby that which is accessible may change. A work state which proceeds from arousal discloses the concern which enables one to analyze the moment viz. to conceptualize. Consequently, within a moment, presupposed by arousal, the self is fixated or oriented toward that of its concern in a type of rapture that renders understanding narrow-minded. Again, concern subjugates the way stimuli are interpreted.

Generalization is a function of the principle in which similars are understood similarly. Such an understanding is made possible by the supposed universality of feeling. In so far as feeling conditions arousal, which conditions conceptualization, which in turn extends knowing, understanding as a whole presupposes feeling. Accessibility is a function of the principle in kind to Ohm's law where the preferred path or current is the one of least resistance or impedance. Furthermore, upon meeting resistance in whatever form conceptually, arousal manifests to combat the drop in voltage or threat to its aim, which is to grasp the diminished feeling conceptually in satisfaction where satisfaction is conditioned upon the event that no resistance is present when judgment is made.

Knowing is a retrieval heuristic structure which generalizes the most readily accessible feeling relative to concern. A heuristic is a notion as pre-conception which is employed to determine the world. This does not imply that the world is assumed to be unknown, but rather the contrary. In so far as the individual is conscious of its doing, the pre-conception is a guide for its doing where the particulars of its moment are used to fill in the frame that the pre-conception presents. Retrieval heuristic connotes the projection of these heuristics whereby they are passed into the world having been pulled from memory, understanding. Finally, a structure merely stipulates that these projected heuristics are ordered and conditional, systematic.

The Coalescence

So then how do 'I' think and if there are at least two 'I' in 'we' then how do 'we' think? Knowing which is projected into the world before the individual as that which is understood, as stated previously, are pre-conceptions. These pre-conceptions were conceptions of prior moments which constitute understanding. However, since they are pre-conceptions are before conceptualization in so far as being anticipated, they are the feeling of what had been and

assumed to be conceived. Thereby, what one is appropriating during Interpretation is feeling. 'I' generalize feeling. The foreign object as that which has not yet been conceptualized within the moment adopts the feeling of a similarly known object of understanding. In other words, knowing projects the feeling of conceptions in relation to the concern at hand. The sort of feeling which is projected is a determinant of the retrieval heuristic structure which draws that which is most readily accessible. For example: Upon seeing a 'chair', we may identify and say 'chair' because the feeling of the chair which exists in understanding matches that which has been projected via pre-conception by knowing. Of course, this synthesis is conditioned by the context qua the arrangement of particulars and concern as the direction and mode to which we respond.

So what about anxiety in all of this? What is the purpose of anxiety? Anxiety sets understanding into motion. It is the source of force which keeps the self conceptualizing. Human expression is the attempt to express a desired attended-to feeling. The feeling is assumed to be known because it's projected by understanding as what is understood. What it is that remains is the appropriation of the particulars of the moment to meet that feeling in concretion whereby another consciousness may receive the feeling as it is understood by that other consciousness. The force which puts this process into action is anxiety; without it there would be no response. Every conception posits a possibility for anxiety whereby arousal is excited under foreign perceived contexts than that of creation. In a more particular form consider the following: A man walks into a room and introduces his friends as 'variable1', I hear 'variable1' and feel 'variable2' as the feeling shared by conception 'variable2' where it was intellectualized and gets aroused by the imperfect calibration and conceptualizes 'variable2' to mean 'variable 1' after confirming that no 'variable 2' were around in accord to this moment. The experiential element of a moment is feeling where one attributes this feeling to the moment's particulars in an orderly manner.

For the readers that wish to put this theory into a more 'practical' perspective, this theory may be intuited as a cognitive explanation of classical conditioning, an existential form of psychoanalysis, a rudimentary formula for the mechanics of human cognition, a case study regarding the author's 'thinking', an aesthetical account for the mundane and obvious, or to get more meaningful; how the world as 'we' see it came to be.

Glossary

Aim: Response, as a reflex, to sensation.

Anticipation: Projection of understanding as knowing before the individual into and constituting world.

Amending: Purpose of conceptualization; realigns knowing with particulars of moment.

Arousal: State of physiological readiness, proceeds feeling, sensation.

Cease and Desist: Primordial descriptive of aim.

Conceptualization: Apperceptive function of developing conception; is parallel to interpretation.

Concern: The dealing with or of anxiety's multitude; situational, conceptual aim.

Elemental Conception: Meaning of feeling relative to context; Anxiety.

Elemental Context: The self as it exists in feeling: Fleeing from feeling

Elemental Knowing: The assumption of the self's existence. Realized upon arousal through conception; is parallel to Kantian intuition.

Feeling: Sensation; primordial being.

Imperfect Calibration: That which had been anticipated does not fit moment.

Inanxiety: Idealized end, as universal meaning, of conceptualization.

Phenomenality: State of being phenomenal.

Moment: Instance of consciousness; period of self being phenomenal.

Provisional: Of or pertaining to a moment; contextual.

State of Mind: Pervading feeling residual from prior moments; 'overall feeling'.

Stimulus: Entity which elicits arousal; conceptual.

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